Digieuro
Eurosüsteem valmistub füüsilist sularaha täiendava digieuro võimalikuks kasutuselevõtuks.
INSERTED BY ANONYMOUS PROXY
Civil war declaration: On April 14th and 15th, 2012 Federal Republic of Germany "_urkenstaats"s parliament, Deutscher Bundestag, received a antifiscal written civil war declaration by Federal Republic of Germany "Rechtsstaat"s electronic resistance for human rights even though the "Widerstandsfall" according to article 20 paragraph 4 of the constitution, the "Grundgesetz", had been already declared in the years 2001-03. more
KÕNE
22. november 2025
Eelarvepoliitika ja kasv Euroopas
Euroopa eesmärk peaks olema edendada positiivset mõjuringi, milles tootlikud kulutused kiirendavad tööviljakuse kasvu, sõnab EKP president Christine Lagarde. Suurem tööviljakus elavdab omakorda potentsiaalset kasvu. See annaks Euroopa sotsiaalsele mudelile tugevama majandusliku aluse.
Loe presidendi kõnet
EKP BLOGI
19. november 2025
EKP ülalt-allapoole stressitestid
Meie 2025. aasta makrotasandi usaldatavusjärelevalve stressitest näitab, et pangad on vastupidavad. Kui aga vaadelda riske, mida ELi-ülene stressitest ei hõlma, näeme mõningaid haavatavusi. Need tähelepanekud toetavad ettevaatlikku lähenemist kapitalipuhvritele.
Loe blogiartiklit
EKP BLOGI
20. november 2025
Erasektori rahastus ja ELi fondid
Euroopa investeerimislünga täitmiseks vajame nii avaliku kui ka erasektori rahalisi vahendeid. Tõhusad ELi investeerimiskavad võivad toimida olulise katalüsaatorina erasektori kapitali jaoks. Blogiartiklist selgub, et igale Euroopa Liidu investeeritud eurole vastab samas ulatuses erasektori rahastus.
Loe blogiartiklit- 21 November 2025
- GOVERNING COUNCIL DECISIONS - OTHER DECISIONSEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (23) +
- 21 November 2025
- PRESS RELEASE
- 19 November 2025
- BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (MONTHLY)
- 19 November 2025
- PRESS RELEASE
- 18 November 2025
- WEEKLY FINANCIAL STATEMENTEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (22) +Annexes
- 18 November 2025
- WEEKLY FINANCIAL STATEMENT - COMMENTARY
- 22 November 2025
- Keynote speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, in the session “Central Banks in a Changing World” at the European Meeting of the Trilateral Commission in Vienna, Austria
- 21 November 2025
- Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the 35th Frankfurt European Banking Congress
- 17 November 2025
- Introductory statement by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European ParliamentEnglishOTHER LANGUAGES (14) +
- 17 November 2025
- Slides by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the J. E. Cairnes lecture of the University of Galway
- 17 November 2025
- Speech by Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, at the Frankfurt Euro Finance Week, organised by the dfv Euro Finance Group
- 11 November 2025
- Interview with Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, conducted by Andrés Stumpf on 4 November 2025
- 10 November 2025
- Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Luís Reis Ribeiro
- 9 October 2025
- Interview with Piero Cipollone, conducted by Žanete Hāka-Rikarde and Priit Pokk on 29 September 2025
- 25 September 2025
- Interview with Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, conducted by Francesco Ninfole on 24 September 2025Related
- 26 September 2025
- 26 September 2025
- 17 September 2025
- Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Anja Ettel and Holger Zschäpitz
- 20 November 2025
- To bridge Europe’s investment gap, we need both public and private funding. Well-designed EU investment programmes can act as a major catalyst for private capital. As this blog post shows, every euro invested by the EU is matched by private finance, thereby doubling its impact.Details
- JEL Code
- E60 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→General
E20 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→General
- 19 November 2025
- Our 2025 macroprudential stress test report shows that banks are resilient. But when we look at risks not included in the EU-wide stress test, we see some pockets of vulnerability. These findings support a cautious approach to capital buffers.Details
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 10 November 2025
- Banks consider the climate performance of firms and buildings in their lending policies. The euro area bank lending survey shows that lower climate risks tend to improve credit conditions. Meanwhile, green investments increase loan demand from firms and households.Details
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
- 7 November 2025
- Climate risks affect credit ratings. And these, in turn, influence how banks can use securities as collateral to borrow money. This post takes a closer look at how the Eurosystem integrates climate change risks into its own collateral framework, through the credit risk channel.Details
- JEL Code
- E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
Q50 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→General
- 4 November 2025
- Many Bulgarians are still hesitant about giving up the Lev on 1 January. Mixed feelings are not uncommon in countries adopting the euro. However, survey data show that support significantly increases once people start using the euro in their daily lives.Details
- JEL Code
- O52 : Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth→Economywide Country Studies→Europe
Z18 : Other Special Topics→Cultural Economics, Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology→Public Policy
- 20 November 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3155Details
- Abstract
- Exploiting three decades of detailed regional data for Germany, we find that when the Green Party is successful at the polls, local hazardous emissions decline. The level of political representation matters, too. Green politicians’ gaining influence at county level is followed largely by a decline in air pollutants that have an immediate adverse health effect. In contrast, when the Green party joins the state government, only greenhouse gas emissions that affect the welfare of future generations via climate change decline. The primary mechanism to achieve lower emissions appears to be a reduction in output, rather than more efficient energy use.
- JEL Code
- D72 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Q53 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Air Pollution, Water Pollution, Noise, Hazardous Waste, Solid Waste, Recycling
- 20 November 2025
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 137Details
- Abstract
- Euro area insurers manage several trillion euro in assets and take a long‑term investment perspective. To counteract the long period of low interest rates, they have shifted towards holding more alternative and less liquid assets. As a result, their balance sheets have become less liquid and more sensitive to market conditions overall. Meanwhile, their holdings of sovereign bonds show a significant home bias, which may have even increased with quantitative easing. Sovereign bonds also serve as a key source of liquidity for insurers, who sell them to raise liquidity to settle large claims after natural disasters. Thus, liquidity shocks can spill over from insurance to the sovereign debt markets, increasing market volatility. Capital markets union would likely help insurers diversify their bond portfolios and promote cross-country risk sharing.
- JEL Code
- G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 19 November 2025
- LEGAL ACT
- 19 November 2025
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 32Details
- Abstract
- Early activation of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), including adoption of a targeted “positive neutral” rate, has become an increasingly common practice within the euro area and beyond. This Focus Piece introduces a relatively novel approach for deriving a target positive neutral rate which links bank capital losses to macroeconomic variables using stress test data. The stress-test-elasticities approach complements existing methodologies developed by the ECB to inform the calibration of the target positive neutral CCyB rate for the euro area. As an example of how the approach works, a target positive neutral CCyB rate for the euro area is simulated based on scenarios designed to capture losses occurring when cyclical systemic risks are neither subdued nor elevated. The simulated results are consistent with actual positive neutral CCyB rates and align well with estimates derived from other ECB approaches.
- JEL Code
- G20, G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
- 19 November 2025
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 32Details
- Abstract
- The severity and the plausibility of stress test scenarios are crucial elements for interpreting the results and ensuring the credibility of stress-testing exercises. This article introduces a comprehensive framework for assessing scenario severity and plausibility in the context of the adverse scenarios used in the EU-wide stress tests. Two families of indicators are developed, characterised by a backward-looking and a forward-looking perspective. Backward-looking indicators compare the scenario with historical regularities, using as key metrics deviations from baseline projections and comparisons with the extreme values of key variables. Forward-looking indicators are drawn from macroeconomic modelling and compare the scenario with projected distributions about future economic developments incorporating the co-movement of variables within a unified analytical framework. These forward-looking metrics enable the severity assessment to account for the prevailing financial conditions and the level of systemic risk in the economy. The analysis presented suggests that the adverse scenarios used in the EU-wide stress tests have become more severe over time, peaking in the 2023 exercise and stabilising in 2025. Taking into account systemic risk, the 2025 scenario appears to be slightly more severe than the 2023 scenario. Overall, the article supports the idea of fostering a more effective definition, monitoring and communication of scenario severity, thereby strengthening the policy relevance and transparency of stress-testing exercises.
- JEL Code
- C53, C54, E37, G18 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
- 19 November 2025
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 32Details
- Abstract
- As authorities across the euro area work towards including climate risks into regular stress-testing frameworks, this article offers a starting point for assessing bank resilience to climate risks that materialise under a short-term horizon. This is relevant since acute physical risks and abrupt policy changes can also materialise at short notice and affect the balance sheet of financial institutions. The analysis uses an adverse macroeconomic backdrop that combines the EBA’s adverse scenario with the Network for Greening the Financial System’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NGFS NDCs) scenarios. It extends the EU-wide 2025 stress test results by incorporating both transition and acute physical climate risks into the credit risk assessment for non-financial corporations by means of top-down models. Transition risks driven by green investments to reduce emissions amplify credit losses and reduce banks’ CET1 capital, particularly in high energy-intensive sectors. Similarly, acute physical risks such as extreme flood events reduce CET1 capital through direct damage, local disruptions and macroeconomic spillovers. While the magnitude of impacts varies across banks, the analysis shows that both types of climate risk can have a moderate but consequential effect on capital ratios. Notably, the banks most exposed to climate-related losses may differ from those identified as the most vulnerable in the broader EU-wide assessment. These findings underscore the importance of incorporating both types of climate risk into regular financial stability assessments.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 19 November 2025
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 32Details
- Abstract
- This article expands the 2025 EU-wide stress test by incorporating a system-wide perspective to capture contagion risks across investment funds and insurance corporations alongside the banking sector. It examines potential short-term contagion effects under the EBA’s adverse scenario as financial institutions adjust their balance sheets in response to stress. These adjustments would result in additional average CET1 ratio depletion of 29 basis points, increasing first-round effects by 12%. Among institutional sectors, investment funds, in particular equity funds, face the greatest losses under the EBA’s adverse scenario, while banks with less sophisticated hedging capabilities are also significantly affected. The findings emphasise the importance of a holistic, system-wide perspective to capture spillover effects both within and across financial sectors. Furthermore, the results show how solvency-driven liquidity shocks can trigger market reactions, which in turn propagate through the financial system and amplify the losses stemming from initial exogenous shocks. The article also includes two boxes which expand the way in which the EBA methodology accounts for counterparty credit risk. It does so by looking at exposures to additional institutional sectors such as central clearing counterparties (Box 1), and the losses that materialise when the failures of counterparties become more interdependent (Box 2).
- JEL Code
- D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 19 November 2025
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 32Details
- Abstract
- Stress test simulations can enhance our understanding of the interplay between bank actions, the real economy and macroprudential buffers. Leveraging BEAST, the ECB’s workhorse top-down stress test model, this article explores impacts stemming from bank behavioural reactions by simulating them under the adverse scenario of the 2025 EU-wide stress test. The article shows that allowing banks to adjust their balance sheets only improves their capital ratios to a minor extent compared with simulations where they are assumed to keep their balance sheets constant. However, these reactions trigger negative credit supply shocks, exacerbating the downturn. Conversely, releasing available releasable buffers reduces banks’ incentives to deleverage and mitigates GDP contraction. These findings highlight how stress test simulations can inform macroprudential policy. More generally, they underscore the value of building sufficient releasable buffers during stable periods, to be used in times of stress to sustain credit supply to the real economy while preserving banks’ resilience.
- JEL Code
- G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 19 November 2025
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 32Details
- Abstract
- This overview article provides an introduction to the 2025 Macroprudential Stress Test Extension Report (MaSTER), released as the 32nd edition of the Macroprudential Bulletin, which investigates how the EU-wide stress test and its extensions provide a broader assessment of the systemic vulnerabilities of euro area banks. The 2025 EU-wide stress test results are expanded via a top-down model-based toolkit to assess additional risks, perform policy simulation exercises, and present novel approaches to gauging the severity of the adverse scenario. In this article, lessons are drawn from these extended stress tests through a comparative analysis of capital depletion. Overall, available results support authorities’ cautious approach to capital buffers. They suggest that, while most banks are resilient to the tested shocks, considering risks not monitored under the current EBA methodology (such as climate risk, liquidity risk and contagion risk) may uncover new vulnerabilities. These exercises, conditioned on the EBA’s 2025 adverse scenario, depend on the selected transmission channels and explore a relevant albeit partial set of risks.
- JEL Code
- G10, G18, G20, G28 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
- 18 November 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3154Details
- Abstract
- Using a large survey of euro area consumers, we conduct an experiment in which respondents report how they would adjust their labor market participation, hours worked, and job search effort (if not employed) in response to randomly assigned windfall gain scenarios. Windfall gains reduce labor supply, but only when the gains are substantial. At the extensive margin, gains of €25,000 or less have no effects, while gains between €50,000 and €100,000 reduce the probability of working by 1.5 to 3.5 percentage points. At the intensive margin, small gains produce no impact, while gains above €50,000 lead to a reduction of approximately one hour of work per week. The effects among women and workers near retirement are stronger. The share of non-employed respondents who stop or reduce job search intensity declines by 1 percentage point for each €10,000 in windfall gain, with the strongest effects observed among older individuals receiving €100,000.
- JEL Code
- E24 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Employment, Unemployment, Wages, Intergenerational Income Distribution, Aggregate Human Capital
D10 : Microeconomics→Household Behavior and Family Economics→General
J22 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Demand and Supply of Labor→Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J68 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers→Public Policy
- 17 November 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3153Details
- Abstract
- We estimate the contribution of discretionary fiscal policy measures to euro area inflation in the post-pandemic era using an extension of Bernanke and Blanchard (2024b)’s semi-structural model. Since the pandemic, aggregate discretionary fiscal measures had a modest yet progressively increasing positive contribution to inflation that partly worked through an indirect effect on wage growth and inflation expectations. However, net indirect taxes helped to contain inflationary pressures, both during the pandemic and energy crises. Fiscal policy, therefore, can be a powerful tool to smooth the inflationary effects of adverse supply shocks, yet may also increase inflation persistence if fiscal stimulus is not timely withdrawn.
- JEL Code
- C5 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E47 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
- 13 November 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIESDetails
- Abstract
- This paper introduces a novel methodology to enhance the granularity of Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) tables. While our general methodology can be applied to any products of interest, we show that the well-documented distortions caused by sectoral aggregation in ICIO tables are particularly pronounced for products with a low substitutability, such as those essential to the green transition (e.g. electric batteries, rare earths). We therefore apply our framework to construct a disaggregated ICIO table that singles out 129 products essential to the energy transition. We then simulate a hypothetical scenario of an East-West supply chain decoupling in green products through a multi-country multi-sector model calibrated with our tailored disaggregated ICIO table. Results reveal substantial economic costs: welfare losses reach 3% and trade between blocs contracts by 20%, even when accounting for trade diversion through neutral countries. We finally quantify how the green supply chain decoupling increases the intensities of greenhouse gas emissions, highlighting how trade barriers on green sectors affect both economic efficiency and climate objectives.
- JEL Code
- C67 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Input?Output Models
F13 : International Economics→Trade→Trade Policy, International Trade Organizations
F18 : International Economics→Trade→Trade and Environment
F51 : International Economics→International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy→International Conflicts, Negotiations, Sanctions
Q48 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Energy→Government Policy
- 13 November 2025
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 379Details
- Abstract
- This paper looks at how Brexit has affected trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) between the United Kingdom and the EU. In 2020 the United Kingdom and the EU signed the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) , establishing the post-Brexit relationship and, in particular, a tariff-free area for goods produced in either of the two economies. However, non-tariff barriers to the trading of goods and services have emerged. Moreover, the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU has affected its attractiveness as an investment target. We analyse recent developments in UK imports and exports with the EU and the rest of the world, in both goods and services, including financial services and tourism. Our estimates suggest that, after the Brexit transition period, UK exports to the EU contracted by almost 40%, due to the emergence of non-tariff barriers with the EU, and the fact that no significant UK trade flows were redirected to other partners. Finally, the analysis of product-level data on German, French, Italian and Spanish exports to the United Kingdom has confirmed the significant negative impact of Brexit, especially for goods highly exposed or highly sensitive to increases in trade costs. The FDI analysis begins with a conjunctural assessment that includes recent trends in EU-UK FDI at a broad level (including sectoral and geographical details), a breakdown of foreign affiliates and an investigation of new FDI projects and jobs in the United Kingdom. The analysis continues with developments in the UK financial sector in terms of the real economy, FDI flows, banks, insurance companies and pension funds, and the evolving status of the United Kingdom as a leading global financial centre. Finally, our analysis also provides an econometric investigation into the potential impact of Brexit on EU-UK FDI, using a gravity model approach. […]
- JEL Code
- F14 : International Economics→Trade→Empirical Studies of Trade
F15 : International Economics→Trade→Economic Integration
F21 : International Economics→International Factor Movements and International Business→International Investment, Long-Term Capital Movements
- 13 November 2025
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN
- 13 November 2025
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 7, 2025Details
- Abstract
- This box draws on micro price evidence on the frequency of price adjustments to disentangle the roles of sticky and flexible-price items in shaping recent disinflation dynamics in the euro area. Inflation of sticky core items has eased only gradually, while flexible core inflation has returned closer to its pre-pandemic average. Among subcategories, flexible goods drove the surge in non-energy industrial goods inflation, while the persistence of services inflation reflects contributions from both sticky and flexible-price items. The recent persistence of sticky core inflation underscores the roles of past cost shocks and elevated wage pressures. In view of its close link to long-term inflation expectations and the moderation of wage pressures, sticky core inflation is likely to disinflate further.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
- 13 November 2025
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 7, 2025Details
- Abstract
- Job-to-job transitions in the euro area are a complementary indicator to standard labour market statistics. These flows, defined as transitions between jobs without a spell of unemployment, capture important adjustment mechanisms in addition to the unemployment rate. Using administrative data for Germany, Spain and France, our analysis highlights the procyclical nature of job-to-job transitions: mobility declines during downturns and rises during expansions. Heterogeneity is also evident across occupations and age groups. Lower-skilled workers are generally more mobile, although the share of higher-skilled movers has increased over time. Younger workers exhibit higher mobility because of temporary contracts, whereas the ageing of the labour force has weighed more on job-to-job transitions in recent years. These indicators provide valuable insights for monitoring labour market tightness and wage pressures. However, administrative datasets are available only with significant lags, prompting efforts to develop more timely measures of labour market flows with complementary survey measures.
- JEL Code
- J62 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers→Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility
J63 : Labor and Demographic Economics→Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers→Turnover, Vacancies, Layoffs
- 12 November 2025
- LEGAL ACT
- 12 November 2025
- ECONOMIC BULLETIN - BOXEconomic Bulletin Issue 7, 2025Details
- Abstract
- Evidence from the ECB Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) – based on a one-off set of questions introduced in the July 2025 wave – suggests that the majority of car purchases in July 2025 were of combustion engine vehicles, followed by hybrid and fully electric cars. Most purchases were of second-hand cars, reflecting concerns about the value of new cars depreciating quickly, particularly among high-income households, as well as limited access to affordable financing options, especially among low-income households. Most respondents in the July 2025 CES wave had no plans to buy a car within the next year, with economic and financial uncertainty and a preference for alternative modes of transportation playing a role, particularly for low-income households. While demand for hybrid cars is expected to increase, interest in fully electric vehicles remains limited. Elevated economic and financial uncertainty suggests that the recovery in car demand will remain gradual and uneven, with the adoption of electric vehicles continuing at a slow pace.
- JEL Code
- D12 : Microeconomics→Household Behavior and Family Economics→Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
L62 : Industrial Organization→Industry Studies: Manufacturing→Automobiles, Other Transportation Equipment
- 12 November 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3151Details
- Abstract
- Is there an undesired side-effect of banking regulation on the non-bank sector? How effective is the non-bank transmission channel of monetary policy in the presence of macroprudential policy? Using a state-dependent local projection approach and a rich dataset capturing macroprudential tightening across euro area countries, we present strong cross-country heterogeneity. In financially conservative markets (Germany, France, the Netherlands), tight monetary policy combined with stricter macroprudential measures significantly contracts investment fund assets. Conversely, financial hubs (Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy) experience counterintuitive expansions under the same policy mix. We introduce a simple balance-sheet framework that shows how interacting funding-cost and collateral-constraint channels generate these opposing responses. Further disaggregation shows that equity funds are more vulnerable to joint tightening in conservative systems, while bond funds partly offset contractionary forces in hubs through higher yields.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G51 : Financial Economics - Network
- Challenges for Monetary Policy Transmission in a Changing World Network (ChaMP)
- 12 November 2025
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 3150Details
- Abstract
- We study how survey-based measures of funding needs and availability influence the transmission of euro area monetary policy to investment. We first provide evidence that funding needs are primarily driven by fundamentals, while perceived funding availability captures financial conditions. Using these two measures, we assess how the effectiveness of monetary policy varies with fundamentals and financial conditions. Our results indicate that monetary policy is most effective when firms’ fundamentals are strong. In contrast, firms with favorable financial conditions exhibit a more muted investment response to monetary policy. By combining these two survey-based measures, we construct an indicator of financial constraints and show that financially constrained firms are more sensitive to monetary policy. These findings offer new light on the transmission of monetary policy to corporate investment, emphasizing not only the role of financial conditions, but also the importance of fundamentals, which are beyond the direct influence of central banks
- JEL Code
- C83 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology, Computer Programs→Survey Methods, Sampling Methods
E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy - Network
- Challenges for Monetary Policy Transmission in a Changing World Network (ChaMP)
Intressimäärad
| Hoiustamise püsivõimalus | 2,00 % |
| Põhilised refinantseerimisoperatsioonid (fikseeritud intressimääraga) | 2,15 % |
| Laenamise püsivõimalus | 2,40 % |
Inflatsioonimäär
Inflatsioonist lähemaltVahetuskursid
| USD | US dollar | 1.1520 | |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 180.56 | |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0.88030 | |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 0.9289 |
POLE ASJATUNDJA? TUTVU SUUNAVIITADEGA
LOE LÄHEMALT
Millega tegeleb Euroopa Keskpank?