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Mar Domenech Palacios
Maurizio Michael Habib
Team Lead - Economist · International & European Relations, International Policy Analysis

Sovereign wealth funds and the euro area: preliminary evidence

Prepared by Mar Domenech Palacios and Maurizio Michael Habib

Published as part of The international role of the euro, June 2024.

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are state-owned investment funds or entities that are commonly established to manage the foreign assets of national states. They are typically categorised as stabilisation funds to finance budget deficits or balance-of-payments needs, savings funds for future generations, pension reserve funds, or reserve investment corporations established to reduce the carrying costs of foreign exchange reserves.[1] Total assets of SWFs reached USD 12 trillion at the end of 2023 (Chart A), matching the equivalent held in global foreign exchange reserves.[2] China hosts the largest SWFs, but other large SWFs are located in resource-rich economies or emerging markets with large current account surpluses. SWF assets are also highly concentrated: the SWFs of China, the United Arab Emirates, Norway, Singapore and Kuwait combined hold about two-thirds of total SWF assets.

Chart A

Total assets and annual gross purchases by SWFs

(USD billions)

Sources: ECB staff calculations based on data from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.

The academic literature on SWFs is limited, largely due to a paucity of data and the limited transparency of their portfolios. The growing size of the assets managed by SWFs has attracted interest in their strategies and their impact on capital flows and financial markets, notably asset prices.[3] However, SWF strategies in terms of investment destinations and currency preferences remain unexplored. This box presents preliminary evidence aimed at filling this gap. It uses data on a subset of transactions by 96 SWFs in 59 countries over the past 24 years, sourced from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. The dataset is restricted to purchases of assets (i.e. it excludes sales). It provides information on the sizes and types of investment, including equities, hybrid financial instruments (such as convertible bonds), real estate private equity funds and venture capital funds. Purchases of debt securities are not covered in the dataset.[4] The dataset provides information on the currency in which purchases have been executed. Currency considerations are generally more relevant for bonds than equities,[5] but they are especially relevant for investments involving companies with dual listings, hybrid securities or depositary receipts, as well as for deals involving unlisted companies, which may be executed through financial conduits that may not use the currency of the country in which the target company is resident.[6] Nonetheless, the available data cover a significant share of investments by SWFs. For instance, the ten largest reporting funds have seen cumulated transactions of around USD 2 trillion since 2000, or about one-quarter of their reported assets and about one-third of their equity holdings in 2023.[7] Annual reported transactions peaked at around USD 250 billion in 2017 and have averaged about USD 150 billion subsequently (Chart A). The whole dataset covers cumulated transactions totalling USD 2.5 trillion since 2000.

Chart B

Destination and origin of purchases by SWFs since 2000

a) Breakdown of SWF purchases by region of destination of investments

b) Breakdown of SWF purchases by region of origin

(percentages)

(percentages)

Sources: ECB staff calculations based on data from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.
Note: Averages for the period 2000-2023.

Chart B shows how SWFs have allocated their purchases of assets since 2000. Panel a) breaks down investments by region of destination, while panel b) breaks them down by region of origin. Reported purchases of assets by SWFs are largely located in major advanced economies, such as the United States and the euro area, and in other advanced economies (Chart B, panel a).[8] These account for around 70% of total reported purchases of SWFs since the beginning of the sample, while investment in emerging economies accounts for the remainder. Investment in the euro area, in particular, accounts for 14% of total reported purchases. Chart B, panel b shows that a significant share, almost 50%, originates from SWFs located in emerging economies, about 20 p.p. more than the share of these economies as a destination of investment. As a result, capital channelled through SWFs flows from poorer to richer countries in line with a well-known paradox in academic literature on international economics.[9]

In terms of currencies, the US dollar is dominant in reported SWF investments, while the euro is the second most important currency. The US dollar accounts for more than two-thirds of SWF investment flows (Table A).[10] The euro accounts for about 9% of total transactions in the dataset.[11] Interestingly, more than 40% of purchases of euro area assets were in US dollars. For instance, this concerns purchases of equity of euro area firms listed in the United States.[12], [13] Similarly, the US dollar shares of investments targeting assets in other advanced economies and emerging market economies are significantly large, at about 40% and 60% respectively. Admittedly, there may be reporting bias as regards acquisitions of unlisted equity.

Interestingly, there is also evidence that the euro is used in deals involving SWF acquisitions outside the euro area. A small share of purchases of assets outside the euro area, around 5-6%, was in euro, but only where the target company was located outside the United States. Deals involving US companies were almost exclusively denominated in US dollars. Euro-denominated deals often involved financial intermediaries or special purpose companies providing bridge financing in major currencies, such as the euro, to finance local projects.[14]

All in all, preliminary analysis of SWFs suggests that the US dollar is often used as a vehicle currency for purchases of assets not involving US-based firms. The euro remains a distant second and is occasionally used to finance acquisitions by SWFs of firms located outside the euro area.

Table A

Currency composition of SWF investments by region of destination of investments

(percentages)

Currency shares

All

Euro area

United States

Other advanced economies

Emerging market economies

Euro

9.2

54.0

0.2

5.3

6.4

US dollar

68.0

43.5

98.7

42.1

61.2

Others

22.8

2.5

1.1

52.6

32.4

Sources: ECB staff calculations based on data from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.
Notes: Transactions with unreported currencies are excluded. Averages for the period 2000-2023.

  1. See Chapter 11 in Das, U., Mazarei, A. and van der Hoorn, H. (eds.) (2010), Economics of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Issues for Policymakers, IMF, December.

  2. In comparison, global private portfolios held by non-bank financial institutions amounted to USD 217 trillion in 2022. See Financial Stability Board (2023), “Global Monitoring Report on Non-Bank Financial Intermediation 2023”, December.

  3. See Bernstein, S., Lerner, J. and Schoar, A. (2013), “The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 27, No 2, Spring, pp. 219-238; Megginson, W., López, D. and Malik, A. (2021), “The Rise of State-Owned Investors: Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Pension Funds”, Annual Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 247-270; or Beck, R. and Fidora, M. (2008), “The impact of sovereign wealth funds on global financial markets”, Occasional Paper Series, No 91, ECB, July.

  4. Some of the largest funds disclose balance sheet information regarding their broad portfolio allocation. For the six largest SWFs, which account for almost half of SWF assets, the share of fixed-income investment ranged between 12% and 40%.

  5. The reason why currency is more relevant for bonds than for equities is that the currency denomination of equity investments is typically the currency of the destination market. Moreover, equity returns tend to be larger than foreign exchange returns by an order of magnitude (see Bekaert, G. and Hodrick, R. (2018), International Financial Management, Cambridge University Press). Asset managers therefore tend to ignore foreign exchange risk for equities except for emerging markets (though hedging for the markets in question tends to be costly).

  6. Depositary receipts are negotiable financial instruments issued by a bank to represent a foreign company's publicly traded securities.

  7. On the one hand, the dataset does not include sales of equity stakes. On the other hand, cumulated transactions do not account for valuation effects, which could significantly influence the value of investments. The ten large funds discussed here include: Government Pension Fund Global (Norway), China Investment Corporation, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Kuwait Investment Authority, Public Investment Fund (Saudi Arabia), GIC Private Limited (Singapore), Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited (Singapore), Qatar Investment Authority, Mudabala Investment Company (United Arab Emirates) and Korea Investment Corporation.

  8. Evidently, there may be a reporting bias in the dataset, as acquisitions in western and other advanced economies may be publicised more openly than investments in less transparent countries. Other advanced economies, such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan, are major destinations of target acquisitions.

  9. According to neoclassical models, capital should flow from capital-rich advanced economies towards capital-poor emerging economies, where returns on capital are expected to be higher. In fact, capital actually flows in the opposite direction. See Lucas, R.E. (1990), “Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No 2, May, pp. 92-96; and Alfaro, L., Kalemli-Ozcan, S. and Volosovych, V. (2008), “Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical Investigation”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 90, No 2, pp. 347-368.

  10. It should be noted that information on currency patterns is not available for a large share of investments, particularly in the early years of the sample.

  11. The third most important currency, not reported in Table A, is the pound sterling, which accounts for 4% of total transactions.

  12. This was the case for the acquisition of stocks of BioNTech SE, Birkenstock Holding Limited, Accenture plc and Stellantis N.V., among others. In other cases, firms are listed in US markets through American Depositary Receipts (ADRs).

  13. In the case of unlisted equities, the currency denomination of the deal may be subject to a degree of uncertainty.

  14. The largest euro deal targeting a company outside the euro area was the purchase of a majority stake in Qatar Railways Development Company for around €17 billion by the Qatar Investment Authority in 2009. This company was founded with the involvement of DB International GmbH, a subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn, for planning and development work of Qatar Railways in the Emirate of Qatar. The second largest euro deal outside the euro area was the sale of the London-based company Logicor, which operates a portfolio of logistics assets in Europe, for €12.2 billion by the Blackstone Group to the China Investment Corporation in 2017.