8th Macroprudential Policy Group Workshop - Call for papers

Background

After the global financial crisis, macroprudential policy has become a distinct and integral part of the European supervisory framework, with the aim of preserving financial stability. Following the recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities, all jurisdictions have made significant progress in establishing an institutional and operational framework for macroprudential policy. In addition, all jurisdictions have a macroprudential toolkit that includes capital buffers, higher risk weights and – to an increasing extent - borrower-based measures. At the same time, there are considerable differences between jurisdictions in terms of organisational structures, responsibilities and accountability regimes, the use and availability of macroprudential instruments, and decision-making processes. This workshop will explore how these aspects affect the use of macroprudential policies and tools in Europe and consequently have an impact on financial stability.

Objectives

This workshop aims to strengthen the dialogue between policymakers and researchers to enhance our collective understanding of the institutional and operational framework and the impact on the use and effectiveness of macroprudential policies.

We welcome all theoretical and empirical contributions on the following topics:

Objectives of macroprudential policy

The use of macroprudential policy depends on the specific objectives of the decision-making authorities. An increase of releasable capital buffers improves the capacity of the financial system to withstand the materialisation of systemic risks (resilience perspective). Other objectives could be to prevent the excessive build-up of vulnerabilities, to smooth the financial cycle (cyclical perspective), and to ensure a sound functioning of financial markets and sustainable developments in real estate markets. In addition, the conceptual framework should also consider the growing importance of non-bank financial intermediation and financial innovation at the boundaries of the regulatory perimeter.

Studies may provide insight into how macroprudential objectives are implemented as part of a comprehensive strategy. For example, they could discuss how varying objectives can explain differences in institutional, analytical, and operational approaches, looking at the available toolkits and the use of specific tools. They might also focus on the differences in views regarding the allocation of decision-making powers and the use and calibration of macroprudential instruments, including how they can complement other economic policies.

The use of capital buffers

Better capitalized banks have significantly contributed to financial stability in recent years. Despite significant shocks (including the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical escalation) and large changes in interest rates, there has been no major widespread disruption to the financial system in the European Union. At the same time, the debate on macroprudential policy is still evolving, raising questions about the early activation, build-up and release of macroprudential buffers, the optimal level of capital within the financial system and the generic nature of macroprudential buffers versus a more targeted focus on specific market segments. A comprehensive overview is needed to reduce any potential overlap or gaps between macroprudential buffers and microprudential requirements and guidance. Studies on the adequacy of the capital framework would also complement discussions on the competitiveness and growth dynamics of the European economy, for which a resilient financial system is an important precondition.

The effectiveness of borrower-based measures

Boom-bust cycles in real estate markets are a key risk for financial stability. Real estate markets are very heterogeneous and subject to country-specific features. This means that the role of macroprudential authorities and the use of borrower-based measures is more differentiated across jurisdictions, thereby also creating challenges for cross-border lending. It would be interesting to review studies that analyse the impact of institutional set-ups on the activation and calibration of borrower-based measures. This could include discussions of the definitions that are used across jurisdictions, implementation lags, and the way in which lending standards are designed to support different macroprudential objectives, for example of a cyclical or structural (resilience/backstop) nature. There are also marked differences in how measures are implemented to avoid unintended procyclical effects in the event of large changes in interest rates or housing prices.

Institutional structure

An independent and effective decision-making structure is important to ensure a timely and effective use of macroprudential measures and overcome any inaction bias. There are many different macroprudential institutional structures across jurisdictions, including a separate macroprudential authority, a joint decision-making body (e.g., a committee comprising a supervisor and central bank and government representatives), and the integration of the macroprudential mandate within the central bank. While each of these models has its own merits and challenges, it would be interesting to explore how these differences in institutional design can affect the use and effectiveness of macroprudential measures. Compared with the vast literature on central bank independence, there has been little research into the costs and benefits of operational and financial independence for macroprudential authorities.

The organisers welcome submissions from authors working for members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) or European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), as well as academics and members of other EU organisations or international financial institutions with a professional interest in the issues outlined above.

Interested authors should send either completed draft papers (strongly preferred) or extended abstracts to workshopmacropru@ecb.europa.eu by 22 August 2025 with the email subject “MPPG workshop submission”. All submissions should be in English (in PDF format) and should include an abstract, as well as the name and email address of a nominated author who could present the paper.

Selection process and workshop attendance

The organising committee will review all submissions received by the deadline, looking at their quality, their analytical relevance, and the level of interest that they are likely to generate. The committee will also take into account the overall balance of the workshop in terms of subject matter and approaches. All authors will be notified by Monday, 8 September 2025 as to whether their papers have been accepted.

In addition to presenters and other speakers, invitations to attend the workshop are also extended to:

• members of the ESCB Macroprudential Policy Group (MPPG)
• members of the ESRB Instruments Working Group (IWG)
• members of any department within the ESCB, SSM and ESRB who are working on issues related to the theme of the workshop
• employees of any EU organisation or international financial institution who are working on issues related to the theme of the workshop

Space constraints may mean that organisers need to limit the number of participants from each institution (not including presenters of accepted papers and discussants).

Expenses

The travel and accommodation expenses of all attendees, presenters and discussants representing the ESCB, ESRB, EU organisations or international financial institutions should be covered by their own organisations. No participation fees will be charged.

Organising committee

• Carsten Detken, MPPG Co-Chair
• Tomas Garbaravičius, MPPG Co-Chair
• Marco van Hengel, MPPG Secretary
• János Szakács, Magyar Nemzeti Bank
• Evelyn Herbert, IWG Secretary
• Anne McTaggart, MPPG Secretariat