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Federico Ravenna
- 14 December 2010
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1279Details
- Abstract
- We show that the composition of imports has important implications for the optimal volatility of the exchange rate. Using input-output data for 25 countries we document substantial differences in the import and non-tradable content of final demand components, and in the role played by imported inputs in domestic production. We build a business cycle model of a small open economy to discuss how the problem of the optimizing policy-maker changes endogenously as the composition of imports and of final demand is altered. Contrary to models where steady state trade openness is entirely characterized by home bias, we find that trade openness is a very poor proxy of the welfare impact of alternative monetary policies. Finally, we quantify the loss from an exchange rate peg relative to the Ramsey policy conditional on the composition of imports, using parameter values that are estimated from OECD input-output tables data. We find that the main determinant of the losses is the share of non-traded goods in final demand.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
F02 : International Economics→General→International Economic Order
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics
- 24 August 2005
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 516Details
- Abstract
- This paper shows that the credibility gain from permanently committing to a fixed exchange rate by joining the European Monetary Union can outweigh the loss from giving up independent monetary policy. When the central bank enjoys only limited credibility a pegged exchange rate regime yields a lower loss compared to an inflation targeting policy, even if this policy ranking would be reversed in a fullcredibility environment. There exists an initial stock of credibility that must be achieved for a policy-maker to adopt inflation targeting over a strict exchange rate targeting regime. Full credibility is not a precondition, but exposure to foreign and financial shocks and high steady state inflation make joining the EMU relatively more attractive for a given level of credibility. The theoretical results are consistent with empirical evidence we provide on the relationship between credibility and monetary regimes using a Bank of England survey of 81 central banks.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
F02 : International Economics→General→International Economic Order
F41 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→Open Economy Macroeconomics