Interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

Interview with Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Christian Siedenbiedel on 20 May 2025

27 May 2025

Mr Lane, inflation rates in the euro area have fallen sharply since autumn 2022. Has inflation been beaten?

As you say, inflation rates were temporarily above 10 per cent in 2022. Over the past two years, we have focused on bringing inflation back down to 2 per cent. This task has now mostly been completed. I am saying “mostly” because some final steps still need to be taken. For example, services inflation is still too high. But we expect it to decline in the coming months, as we think wage inflation is coming down. So the disinflation from the high inflation of 2022 is on track – but unfortunately new challenges are emerging.

Over what time frame are you expecting the inflation rate to sustainably meet the ECB’s 2 per cent target?

Recently, the inflation rate in the euro area stood at 2.2 per cent, which isn’t so far from our 2 per cent target. I believe that the inflation rate will remain in a zone close to 2 per cent in the coming months. But part of your question is about whether this will be on a sustained basis. And this is where we have to work out whether new challenges, in particular those to do with trade policy, could cause an inflation issue in either direction.

Many people have the feeling that they are noticing inflation much more in the supermarket. What do you say to them?

It is not unfounded. Food inflation remains well above 2 per cent – currently around 3 per cent. For unprocessed food, for example fruit and vegetables, it is even close to 5 per cent. So this perception is correct: “supermarket inflation” is higher than the general inflation rate. But this is offset by other developments, such as energy prices. Goods price inflation is also below the current headline inflation rate.

How much is the reduction in inflation really down to the ECB – and to what extent is it simply a consequence of the sharp rise and subsequent fall in energy prices?

This time is different from the 1970s. At that time, many central banks didn’t manage to convince people that inflation would fall again – although the Bundesbank did better than others. People expected inflation to remain high. This time around we made it clear that the ECB would deliver on price stability. Through our monetary policy, we have prevented double-digit inflation from getting entrenched. So we played our part and ensured that this period of high inflation remained temporary. Due to our intervention, fluctuations in energy prices have not led to a permanent surge in inflation.

What impact do you expect Donald Trump’s tariffs to have on inflation in the euro area?

This has been the subject of intense debate since the election in November. Several factors play a role: first, the exchange rate between the US dollar and the euro. Many expected that tariffs would weaken the euro. So far, however, the opposite has occurred. Second, the tariffs have an impact on global economic growth; the slowdown has pushed down oil and gas prices, and this was not in the initial discussion but is proving important. And third, with respect to trade between the United States and China, China is likely to export less to the United States and more to Europe. So there are a number of factors that could lead to lower inflation in the euro area. But we also have to keep in mind that we don’t know the outcome of the negotiations between the EU and the United States.

At this point, is it possible to predict what’s ultimately going to happen?

The outcome is still quite open at the moment. For the time being, there are some factors that tend to support a drop in euro area inflation. However, the picture could shift if, for example, the negotiations between the EU and the United States fail, with the United States imposing higher tariffs and the EU implementing counter tariffs. Supply chains could also be disrupted – this could drive up inflation.

Are there differences between short-term and long-term effects?

I would actually distinguish between three time horizons: short term, medium term and long term. In the coming months, in other words for the remainder of 2025, the inflation rate is expected to be close to target. Over the medium term, the impact of US tariffs on inflation could materialise, including through the exchange rate and energy prices. Looking further ahead to the long term, analysts and financial markets are reasonably confident that inflation will return to the ECB’s target. The main focus of the ECB’s monetary policy is on the medium-term horizon: that is to say, one or two years ahead.

Is there any reason to be concerned that people’s inflation expectations could rise more quickly again because the experience of very high inflation is still so recent?

As a directional statement, I agree. Before the pandemic, many were convinced inflation would stay very low. The high inflation episode was a painful reminder that inflation can arise. But such a combination of extraordinary events – the pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine – is very rare. The more concrete question for us is: could a world of shocks relating to structural changes – arising from challenges to globalisation, increased automation, changing demography – push inflation noticeably below or above 2 per cent, and how responsive will inflation expectations be? Part of our job will be to make sure expectations remain anchored, that people have the reassurance that if inflation moves away from 2 per cent we will bring it back.

What impact do the current labour shortages and low unemployment have on inflation?

There is certainly a difference compared with the pre-pandemic period. That’s why I don’t think we will return to inflation rates that are as low as they were back then. When unemployment is low, firms and employees are more likely to settle on wage increases – perhaps around 3 per cent on average in the euro area. This is a normalisation and, allowing for rising labour productivity, makes our 2 per cent target more credible. But I do not see any signs of a wage-price spiral at present, and this also applies to Germany.

In Belgium, wages are, in part, directly bound to inflation. Has that added to inflation there?

During the period of high inflation, wages rose rapidly in Belgium but, as inflation fell, wage growth slowed down quickly again. In Germany, there was a different pattern: it took longer for wages to go up. But there is no major difference when looking at the average over three to five years.

Do you think it is possible that the new protectionism will lead to deglobalisation in the longer term, resulting in structurally higher inflation rates?

It is important to differentiate between temporary and permanent effects. For many firms the business model is connected to globalisation. A phase of deglobalisation could initially dampen economic growth, which would make it more likely that inflation rates would fall. Following that transition, inflation and its volatility could increase as the offsetting effect of favourable imports fades. It could mean that, as a central bank, we have to be more active in our policy responses to return inflation to 2 per cent over the medium term.

The Federal Reserve fears that US tariffs could lead to transitory, i.e. temporary, inflation. Would it leave inflation in the euro area unaffected if US rates rise?

The world needs the Federal Reserve to maintain price stability for the United States. If this means high US interest rates, it can lead to a stronger dollar and thereby somewhat higher inflation for Europe in the short term. In the medium term, however, high US interest rates mostly hold back the global economy – which tends to lead to lower inflation in the euro area. There are always some spillover effects.

What does all this mean for the ECB’s interest rate policy?

We need to find a middle path. If we keep interest rates too high for too long, the disinflation pressure of US tariffs could cause inflation rates to fall below our target. If we cut too much and too quickly, a strengthening economy and other factors could drive inflation back up. This is why we will pay close attention to the data in our next meetings. If we see signs of further falling inflation, we will respond with further interest rate cuts – but the range of discussion is not that wide: no one is talking about dramatic rate cuts. We are in a zone of normal central banking.

Are the key ECB interest rates now in the neutral range?

The neutral interest rate can only be estimated and it is a long-term concept. In the long term, the neutral interest rate could be around where we are now. But the world is not in equilibrium and the appropriate interest rate may be different in the short term. I would differentiate between the three policy rate zones: a clearly restrictive one with rates say in the high twos or above; and a clearly accommodative one – for the sake of discussion, say rates below 1.5 per cent are clearly accommodative. Going there would only be appropriate in the event of more substantial downside risks to inflation, or a more significant slowdown in the economy. I do not see that at the moment. And there is a zone in between, where it is more of a question of cyclical management. We are navigating in that zone at the moment. This is the focus of the discussions at the ECB.

Can the ECB be indifferent to exchange rate developments when there is a sharp depreciation of the dollar, like at the moment? Unlike the Bundesbank in the past, you aren't pursuing an official exchange rate policy...

The exchange rate is of course an important factor in the development of inflation, even if we do not pursue an explicit exchange rate policy. However, most trade in the euro area takes place between countries sharing the euro as a common currency and, therefore, the exchange rate does not play a role. Trade with the United States and other regions of the world is important but it’s not the dominant factor. At the same time, we need to look at the impact of exchange rate shifts in a situation like we have now.

Do you think that the euro could replace the US dollar as the world's reserve currency as a consequence of the unreliable economic policies of the United States?

I think the question whether the euro should overtake the US dollar is not so important. I can imagine that the euro will become more important as a reserve currency in the current situation. In the first decade of the euro, there was an optimism that we would no longer live in a world with a single world currency, the dollar. Now, the United States is facing all kinds of questions about its role in the world economy. The natural second currency is the euro. It is well placed to gain a bigger share of the market. This could be supported by further European integration – to put the euro on a firmer foundation.

In your estimation, how great is the risk that we will now see more frequent waves of inflation, like those seen recently?

The specific circumstances of the last wave of inflation will probably not be repeated quickly. Something like that occurs at most every few decades. Nevertheless, I also consider very low inflation rates, like those before the pandemic, to be unlikely in the current circumstances where there are so many upheavals and changes. There could be more external shocks and fluctuations in inflation rates than in the past. That means that we have an important job to do at the ECB. We may need to become even more active than before in adjusting our policy to the incoming shocks.