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Kezdőlap Média Kisokos Kutatás és publikációk Statisztika Monetáris politika Az €uro Fizetésforgalom és piacok Karrier
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Felix Noth

11 June 2015
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1804
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Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. The risk premium required by depositors was lower, and loan rates were higher for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. These effects are economically very small though. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
JEL Code
C30 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→General
C78 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Game Theory and Bargaining Theory→Bargaining Theory, Matching Theory
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
L51 : Industrial Organization→Regulation and Industrial Policy→Economics of Regulation