#### Monetary Policy Announcements and Expectations: Evidence from German Firms

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Conference "Inflation in a changing environment" European Central Bank

September 2019

#### The question

Do monetary policy announcements impact **firm expectations** and, if so, how?

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Study of (survey) expectations quickly expanding in recent years

- One reason: stronger focus on central bank communication and the management of expectations
- Empirical studies mainly on professional forecasters and households

We focus on actual price setters' expectations of own prices and production

#### This paper

Consider effects of non-conventional and conventional monetary policy announcements on firm expectations

Unique data set: Ifo Business Survey Industry (IBS)

• Large monthly panel of German firms, 2004 - 2018

Data on

- expectations regarding own production and prices 3 months ahead
- many firm-specific variables
- day of response for each firm

#### **Our results**

Monetary policy announcement affect firms' price and production expectations *non-linearly* 

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Interpretation: attention to *information content* of announcement endogenous to the size of the surprise

- Central bank better informed than agents (Romer&Romer 2000)
- Monetary policy has 'information effect' in addition to standard effects (Melosi 2017, Nakamura&Steinsson 2018)
- Cannot be explained by direct measures of communication/information (Jarociński&Karadi 2019)

#### **Further literature**

**Coibion & Gorodnichenko** (2012, 2015): professional forecasters adjust forecasts only sluggishly

**Coibion et al.** (2015, 2018a): behavior of price setters

**Coibion et al.** (2018b): effect of firm expectations on decisions

**Bachmann & Elstner** (2015, ifo survey): up to 1/3 of firms systematically over- or underpredict production growth

**Bachmann & Zorn** (2018, ifo investment survey): subjective determinants, including expectations, drive investment decisions

**Balleer & Zorn** (2019): effects of monetary policy on firms' price setting

Enders et al. (2019, ifo surey): effect of firm exp. on decisions

## Data

#### **Expectations data**

#### Ifo Business Survey Industry

- Provided by the LMU-ifo Economics and Business Data Center (EBDC)
- Micro data available since the 1980s
- Our sample: manufacturing sector, 2004 2018
- Unit of observation is 'plant' or business area of a firm
- In total 400,000 observations (2500 firms per month)
- For 220,000 observations (1500 per month) day of response recorded (requires survey to be answered online)

 $\rightarrow$  Sample over time

 $\rightarrow$  Descriptive statistics

#### **Survey questions**

Expectations regarding prices

"Expectations for the next 3 months: Taking changes of terms and conditions into account, our domestic sales prices (net) for product XY will probably increase [1], not change [0], decrease [-1]."

Expectations regarding production

"Expectations for the next 3 months: Our domestic production activity regarding good XY will probably increase [1], not change [0], decrease [-1]."

 $\rightarrow$  Time series

 $\rightarrow$  Leading indictator

#### Monetary policy events

# Euro Area Monetary Policy Event Study Database (EA-MPD) compiled by Altavilla et al. (2019)

- High-frequency changes in OIS rates (inter alia) around monetary policy events
- Monetary-event window covering both press conference and press release

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- Monetary-event window covering both press conference and press release

#### Jarociński-Karadi (2019) monetary policy shocks

- Based on high-frequency changes in interest rates and stock market around ECB meetings and important speeches
- Use VAR with sign restrictions to separate 'pure' monetary policy shocks from central bank information shocks

# Non-conventional monetary policy announcements

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We largely follow Del Negro et al. (2015), but ...

- ... analyze firm expectations instead of forecasters
- ... know the day of the response: focus on narrow window around announcement, less need for macro controls

Pool observations between January 2009 and June 2018

 $\rightarrow$  List of events (Dedola et al. 2018)

#### **Empirical approach**

$$\Delta f(y)_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{m} \beta_m D_{i,m} + \delta_1 f(y)_{i,t-1} + \delta_2 Z_{i,t-1} + u_{i,t}$$

- f(y)<sub>i,t</sub>: expectation of firm i regarding y in next 3 months, reported in month t
- $\Delta f(y)_{i,t}$ : change of expectations relative to previous month
- Z<sub>i,t-1</sub>: lagged controls (prices, production, demand, (foreign) orders, capacity utilization, and average state of business)
- $D_{i,m} = 1$  if response within two working days after announcement m
- $D_{i,m} = 0$  if response within two working days before announcement *m*, or if no announcement in month

 $\rightarrow$  Controls  $\rightarrow$  Questions

#### Effects of non-conventional announcements

		Dependent v prices	variable: cha	nange in the expectations for production		
12-month LTROs	-0.156***	-0.101***	-0.005	-0.140***	-0.066	-0.056
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.051)
6-month LTROs	-0.036	-0.034	-0.043	-0.046	-0.015	-0.025
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.041)
12/13-month LTROs	-0.029	-0.064**	-0.041	-0.136***	-0.153***	-0.080*
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.044)
36-month LTROs	0.070**	0.086**	0.056	-0.003	0.027	0.070
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.056)
OMT details	-0.054**	-0.038	-0.034	-0.192***	-0.135***	-0.123***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.044)
Forward Guidance	-0.030** (0.013)	-0.019 (0.012)		-0.005 (0.019)	0.001 (0.018)	
TLTROs	-0.070	-0.055	-0.023	-0.042	0.010	0.048
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.074)
ABSPP+CBPP3	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.013)		-0.036* (0.021)	0.008 (0.021)	
APP details	0.006 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.020)		0.028 (0.026)	0.030 (0.027)	
PSPP share limit	-0.027 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.017)		0.064** (0.031)	0.101*** (0.033)	
APP end	0.034	0.028	-0.006	-0.013	-0.011	-0.055
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.067)
Expectation, t-1 Further Controls Monthly time fixed effects	Х	X X	X X X	х	x x	X X X
Observations	236635	201212	201212	230028	197239	197239
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.29	0.29	0.25	0.32	0.33

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#### Effects of non-conventional announcements vary

Not many announcements had a significant effect on firms expectations

Despite announcements being easing, expectations fell  $\rightarrow$  in line with other studies of non-conventional announcements

 $\Rightarrow$  To understand results, turn to more systematic analysis using broader measure of monetary policy shocks

# Monetary policy surprises

#### **Linear Effects**

We now use full sample, July 2004 to June 2018

- EA-MPD features 155 monetary surprises in this period, we match 136 → Response days
- Again use window ±2 working days around event
   → Most events on Thursday: Window from Tuesday before to
   Monday after (excluding event day)

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- EA-MPD features 155 monetary surprises in this period, we match 136 → Response days
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   Monday after (excluding event day)

Similar specification as before

$$\Delta f(y)_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta D_{i,m} \varepsilon_m + \delta_1 f(y)_{i,t-1} + \delta_2 Z_{i,t-1} + u_{i,t}$$

- *D<sub>i,m</sub>* dummy variable indicating whether firm answered within two working days of event
- $\varepsilon_m$ : monetary surprise ( $\Delta$ 1-month OIS in event window)
- Other variables as before

#### **Linear effects**

	Dependent variable: change in the expectations for					
	pri	ces	production			
OIS, 1-month	0.0008 (0.001)	<b>0.0012*</b> (0.001)	0.0017* (0.001)	<b>0.0001</b> (0.001)		
Expected prices, t-1	-0.4540*** (0.004)	-0.5777*** (0.006)				
Expected production, t-1			-0.4950*** (0.004)	-0.6223*** (0.005)		
Average state of business, t-1	0.1338*** (0.008)	0.0771*** (0.009)	0.1322*** (0.011)	0.0912*** (0.012)		
Further controls		Х		х		
Observations	65003	58779	62968	57379		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.28	0.24	0.33		
Observations before	31978	28761	30960	28058		
Observations after	33025	30018	32008	29321		

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

 $\rightarrow$  Controls

 $\rightarrow$  Questions

# Expansionary monetary policy announcements *decrease* price expectations (if significant)

#### **Nonlinear Effects**

Counterintuitive result, like for non-conventional announcements

• But those were large (avg.  $|\Delta 1MOIS|$  double than normal)

 $\rightarrow$  Surprises

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Large shocks may bias the results if large surprises have different effects than small ones

#### **Nonlinear Effects**

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 $\rightarrow$  Surprises

Large shocks may bias the results if large surprises have different effects than small ones

Explore non-linearity

- Semi-parametric: sort surprises by size into 7 bins, allowing for different effects → Distribution
- 2. Non-parametric: Kernels
- 3. Parametric: include cubed term in regression

#### Nonlinear effects on expectations: bins



#### Nonlinear effects on expectations: kernels



#### **Cubic term**

	Dependent variable: cha prices			ge in the expectations for production		
OIS, 1-month	-0.0005 (0.001)	- <b>0.0007</b> (0.001)	-0.0035** (0.0017)	-0.0018 (0.002)	- <b>0.0038**</b> (0.0015)	-0.0039* (0.002)
OIS, 1-month, cubic (coeff. & s.e. $\times 10^{-4}$ )	0.074 (0.065)	<b>0.114*</b> (0.067)	1.024*** (0.273)	0.210*** (0.078)	<b>0.242***</b> (0.077)	1.005*** (0.371)
Expected prices, t-1	-0.454*** (0.004)	-0.577*** (0.006)	-0.576*** (0.006)			
Expected production, t-1				-0.495*** (0.004)	-0.622*** (0.005)	-0.622*** (0.005)
Average state of business, t-1	0.135*** (0.009)	0.078*** (0.009)	0.083*** (0.009)	0.134*** (0.011)	0.094*** (0.012)	0.095*** (0.013)
Further controls		Х	х		х	Х
Observations Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> Observ. before Observ. after Excl. largest OIS changes	65003 0.23 31978 33025	58779 0.28 28761 30018	56491 0.28 27395 29096 X	62968 0.24 30960 32008	57379 0.33 28058 29321	55155 0.33 26731 28424 X

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

 $\rightarrow$  Controls

 $\rightarrow$  Questions

#### **Cubic term**



Straight line: estimate of linear term. Shaded area: 90% confidence interval around cubic component. Horizontal axis: interest rate surprise (bp); vertical axis: change in expectations.

Significant evidence for smaller effects of large announcements.  $\rightarrow$  In line with 'information effect': large expansionary policy surprises carry bad news (or trigger reassessment of expectations)

#### The role of the qualitative dependent variables

	Dependent variable: change in expectations for						
	prices,	production,	state of business,	state of business,			
	neutral in t-1	neutral in t-1	qual. measure	scale measure			
OIS, 1-month	-0.0009	-0.002	-0.004***	-0.081**			
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0016)	(0.033)			
OIS, 1-month, cubic (coeff. & s.e. $\times 10^{-4}$ )	0.172***	0.149*	0.395***	4.042**			
	(0.057)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(1.942)			
Further Controls	х	х	х	х			
Observations	45258	37627	56989	52905			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.12	0.31	0.17			
Observations before	22209	18247	27916	27139			
Observations after	23049	19380	29073	25766			

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

#### **Further robustness**

We also check whether our results are robust to

- using different window sizes
- controlling for the financial crisis period
- controlling for aggregate uncertainty in the economy
- including firm fixed effects
- clustering standard errors at the firm level

Effects are qualitatively similar in all cases for production and most cases for prices.

 $\rightarrow$  Prices

 $\rightarrow$  Production

### Central bank information and communication

#### Central bank information shocks

What drives these non-linear responses?

Possible answer: when shocks are large, agents are more likely to see shock as also carrying information about the state of the economy

Alternative: central bank communication differs for large shocks

 $\rightarrow$  Analyze whether central bank information shock by Jarociński & Karadi (2019) can account for non-linearity

#### Central bank information shocks

	Depender	nt variable: d	change in the e	expectations for
	pr	ices	prod	luction
OIS, 1-month	-0.002	-0.003*	-0.005***	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.0016)	(0.002)	(0.002)
OIS, 1-month, cubic (coeff. & s.e. $\times 10^{-4}$ )	0.137**	0.157**	0.261***	0.226***
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.079)	(0.082)
Central bank information shock	0.004*	0.006**	0.003	0.0005
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Monetary policy shock		0.004 (0.003)		-0.006* (0.004)
Controls	Х	Х	Х	Х
Observations	56109	56109	54754	54754
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.28	0.28	0.33	0.33
Observations before	26706	26706	26046	26046
Observations after	29403	29403	28708	28708

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

#### **Central bank communication**

Central bank information shock cannot explain non-linearity

Use institutional set-up of ECB meetings to disentangle effects of interest-rate changes that are due to

- monetary policy shock as such (press-release window)
- central-bank communication (press-conference window)

 $\Rightarrow$  Separately consider responses to surprise in press-release and press-conference window

#### **Central bank communication**

	Depender	nt variable: cha	nge in the expectations f		
	P	prices	production		
	Release	Conference	Release	Conference	
OIS, 1-month	-0.002	-0.007**	-0.007***	-0.0003	
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	
OIS, 1-month, cubic (coeff. & s.e. $\times 10^{-4}$ )	0.169**	2.980***	0.363***	1.110	
	(0.077)	(0.881)	(0.088)	(1.139)	
Controls	Х	Х	Х	Х	
Observations	58779	58779	57379	57379	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.28	0.28	0.33	0.33	
Observations before	28761	28761	28058	28058	
Observations after	30018	30018	29321	29321	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

#### **Central bank communication**

Non-linearity seems to stem from press release window

Firms perceive large surprises in the policy decision as such differently than small surprises

- $\Rightarrow$  This does not seem to be due to effects from communication
- $\Rightarrow$  Non-linearity embedded in monetary policy shock per se

## Conclusion

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How do monetary policy announcements impact firm expectations?

- Evidence for non-linear effects of announcements
- Large announcements have smaller effects than small announcements
- Interpretation: only large shocks contain additional information/are perceived to contain additional information revealed by the central bank

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Implications

- Gradualism?
- Results call for further model-based analysis regarding optimal monetary policy (Jia 2019)

# Appendix

#### The sample



Response dates are not available is the following months: 06-2009, 12-2009, 08-2014, 11-2015, 03-2016, 05-2016, 06-2016, and 12-2016.

#### Online sample vs. full sample

	Full sample			Sample with part. date		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs.
Employees	489	3563.26	428790	548	3771.49	232267
Expected production, t	0.04	0.57	414486	0.06	0.58	224473
Expected prices, t	0.08	0.47	426451	0.08	0.47	231031
Production, t-1	-0.00	0.58	413784	0.01	0.58	224232
Prices, t-1	0.03	0.44	426706	0.04	0.43	231021
Demand, t-1	0.02	0.65	428220	0.03	0.66	231851
Orders, t	-0.14	0.65	426175	-0.12	0.66	231498
Foreign orders, t	-0.16	0.58	422043	-0.14	0.60	229778
Capacity utilization, t	81.08	16.57	366987	81.63	16.19	208385
State of business, t	0.12	0.68	428291	0.15	0.69	231959
Exp. state of business, t	0.02	0.60	427022	0.02	0.60	231297
Exp. state of business						
(scale), t	52.47	16.46	243925	52.64	16.44	213926
Inventories, t	-0.11	0.48	294251	-0.09	0.48	159477

#### **Expectations**



Notes: Shaded areas mark recession periods as defined by the German Council of Economic Experts.

Price- and production expectations tend to co-move (exception: phase of 'missing disinflation') Lower dispersion of price expectations compared to production

#### Expectations and aggregate realizations



*Notes:* Shaded areas mark recession periods as defined by the German Council of Economic Experts.

#### Monetary policy surprises, 2004-2018



90% of 1-month OIS changes less than 3 bp in absolute value

#### Monetary policy surprises, 2009-2018



#### Non-conventional announcements

Date	Announcement
05/07/2009	12-months Longer-term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)+other
	measures
08/04/2011	6-months LTROs + other measures
10/06/2011	12 and 13-months LTROs
12/08/2011	36-months LTROs
08/02/2012	Announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) pro-
	gram
09/06/2012	OMT implementation details
07/04/2013	First forward guidance announcement
06/05/2014	Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs)
09/04/2014	Announcement of the Asset-backed Securities Purchase Program
	(ABSPP)
	and the new Covered Bonds Purchase Program (CBPP3)
01/22/2015	Announcement of the expanded Asset Purchase Program (APP)
03/05/2015	APP implementation details
09/03/2015	Increase in public sector purchase program (PSPP) share limit
03/10/2016	Announcement of Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP)
12/08/2016	First extension of the APP
10/26/2017	Second extension of the APP
06/14/2018	Announcement of the end of the APP

Notes: Extended version of list provided by Dedola et al. (2018)

#### **Control variables**

- Expected prices t-1
- Expected production *t*-1
- Average state of business t-1
- Prices *t-1*
- Prices t-2
- Production t-1
- Production *t-2*
- Demand t-1
- Demand t-2
- Orders *t-1*
- Foreign orders t-1
- Capacity utilization t-1

 $\rightarrow$  back non-conv.

 $\rightarrow$  back linear

 $\rightarrow$  back nonlinear

#### Questions

Name	Question	Possible answers
Expected prices	Expectations for the next 3 months: Taking changes of terms and conditions into account, our domestic sales prices (net) for product XY will probably	increase [1] not change [0] decrease [-1]
Expected production	Expectations for the next 3 months: Our domestic production activity regarding good XY will probably $\ldots$	increase [1] not change [0] decrease [-1]
Prices	Tendencies in the previous month: Taking changes of terms and conditions into account, our domestic sales prices (net) for product XY have	increased [1] not changed [0] decreased [-1]
Production	Tendencies in the previous month: Our domestic production activities with respect to product XY have $\ldots$	increased [1] not changed [0] decreased [-1]
Demand	Tendencies in the previous month: The demand situation with respect to product XY was $\ldots$	better [1] not changed [0] worse [-1]
Orders	We consider our order backlog to be	relatively high [1] sufficient [0] too small [-1]
Foreign orders	We consider our order backlog for exports to be $\ldots$	relatively high [1] sufficient [0] too small [-1]
Capacity utilization	The current utilization of our capacities for producing XY (standard utilization = $100\%$ ) is currently $x\%$ .	x is a value between 30 and 100 divisible by 10
State of business	Current situation: We evaluate our state of business for XY to be	good [1] satisfactory [0] bad [-1]
Expected state of business	Expectations for the next 6 months: Our state of business for XY will $\ldots$	improve [1] stay the same [0] worsen [-1]

 $\rightarrow$  back non-conv.  $\rightarrow$  back linear  $\rightarrow$  back nonlinear

#### Response time within month



#### Monetary policy surprises: bins



#### Further robustness: price expectations

		Dependent variable: change in price expectations				
	8 w.day window	Full window	Crisis dummy	Uncertainty dummy	Firm fixed effects	Clustered std. errors
OIS, 1-month	-0.0008 (0.001)	-0.0016*** (0.0005)	-0.0008 (0.001)	0.000004 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.001)	-0.0007 (0.001)
OIS, 1-month, cubic (coeff. s.e. $\times 10^{-4}$ )	0.138** (0.067)	0.080*** (0.021)	0.129 (0.085)	0.175* (0.090)	0.100 (0.069)	0.114* (0.067)
OIS, 1-month $ imes$ crisis dummy			-0.0006 (0.002)			
OIS, 1-month × uncertainty dummy				-0.002 (0.002)		
Controls	х	х	х	х	х	х
Observations	72013	188211	58779	58779	58779	58779
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.32	0.28
Observations before	41939		28761	28761	28761	28761
Observations after	30074		30018	30018	30018	30018

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01.

#### Further robustness: production expectations

	Dependent variable: change in production expectations					
	8 w.day window	Full window	Crisis dummy	Uncertainty dummy	Firm fixed effects	Clustered std. errors
OIS, 1-month	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
OIS, 1-month, cubic (coeff. s.e. $\times 10^{-4}$ )	0.224*** (0.075)	0.342*** (0.025)	0.506*** (0.104)	0.453*** (0.102)	0.237*** (0.077)	0.242*** (0.077)
OIS, 1-month × crisis dummy			-0.011*** (0.003)			
OIS, 1-month × uncertainty dummy				-0.008*** (0.003)		
Controls	Х	х	х	х	Х	х
Observations Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> Observations before Observations after	70239 0.33 40864 29375	184184 0.33	57379 0.33 28058 29321	57379 0.33 28058 29321	57379 0.37 28058 29321	57379 0.33 28058 29321

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.