Monetary Policy in Incomplete Market Models: Theory and Evidence

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Policy and the business cycle: interactions

Quantitative importance of these interactions in reality?

- Estimate structural (HANK) model
- Non-parametric approach to modeling monetary and fiscal policy
 - feed in empirical dynamics
- Counterfactuals shutting down monetary and/or fiscal policy
- Theoretical result: reverse-engineer government transfer scheme which renders the model isomorphic to a complete-markets counterpart
 - quantitatively decompose difference between incomplete and complete-markets

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Modeling policy

- Typical approach in (HA)NK literature: impose structure on government policy:
 - ▶ include optimizing government or policy rule, e.g.:

$$i_t = \phi \pi_t$$

- Approach here: let the data speak on policy
 - replace policy rule by Impulse Response Function (IRF), e.g.:

$$i_t = f(\varepsilon_t, \varepsilon_{t-1}, \varepsilon_{t-2}, ...)$$

where ε_t are exogenous shocks (can include e.g. productivity shocks, monetary policy shocks, etc).

- estimate f in from the data and plug into model
- effectively renders policy variables exogenous (but allows for correlation with structural shocks, so arguably still endogenous in an economic sense)

Why isn't this the standard approach?

Indeterminacy.

- Equilibrium not unique in standard NK model with exogenous policy
 - "Taylor Principle"
- When replacing policy rule by IRF, government policy cannot react "off the equilibrium"
- This paper: resolve indeterminacy issue beforehand, exogenous policy then possible

Resolving indeterminacy

Follow Hagedorn (2017), who shows that equilibrium is determinate under two conditions:

- financial markets are incomplete
- exogenous path of nominal government expenditures (conditional on shocks)

Alternative assumptions

- Difficult to know the "right" way to resolve indeterminacy
 - no empirical evidence on policy actions off the equilibrium path
- In the spirit of this paper, re-estimate model alternative assumptions on policy
 - horse race between current assumption, policy rules and FTPL?

Semi-parametric approach?

• Consider policy rule given by:

$$i_t = \phi \pi_t + f(\varepsilon_t, \varepsilon_{t-1}, \varepsilon_{t-2}, ...)$$

- ullet Guarantees determinacy iff $\phi>1$
- Need to find f such that interest rate response in the model coincides with the data
 - iterative procedure?

Estimation

- Structural estimation: nice, but is it even even needed here?
- Currently, only price and wage stickiness parameters are estimated
 - parameter values could be obtained from micro studies or estimates of slope NKPC
 - current estimates point towards very strong nominal rigidity (avg. price duration of almost 3 years)

Bigger picture

Policy interactions matter quantitatively. This raises a number of questions:

- What kind of behavior on the part of the policy makers (central bank and fiscal authority) can rationalize the empirical policy interactions?
- Are these interactions desirable? What are the welfare effects in the model?
 - ► Should fiscal policy be meddling in central bank's business and vice versa?
 - ★ What about Tinbergen's rule (one instrument per target)?
 - ★ Fiscal policy to distributional side effects of monetary policy?

Can start addressing these question with the new model framework.