Money and Banking in a New Keynesian Model

Monika Piazzesi (Stanford), Ciaran Rogers (Stanford), Martin Schneider (Stanford)

How does a convenience yield on the policy rate affect the transmission mechanism?

Typical models assume central bank controls household savings rate

- In particular, the rate of return, *i^S*, on a safe, pecuniary asset
- Money supply controlled by central bank with $i^{D} = 0$, and price level endogenously adjusts to clear money market.

In practice, they control the rate on short safe assets held by intermediaries...

- Central bank sets i^{P} on short safe assets that are held to back issuance of inside money
- By relaxing collateral/liquidity constraints, they provide non-pecuniary benefits

... whose convenience yield dampens power of rate policy ...

- · Policy tightening lowers convenience yield on deposits, reducing total return of savings, dampening fall in consumption
- Dampening depends on pass-through of policy rate to deposit rate

... generating weaker policy in a "floor" vs. a "corridor" regime.

- In Abundant Reserves ("floor") Regime, nominal rigidities in bank assets bolsters dampening effect
- In Scarce Reserves ("corridor") Regime, interest-elastic deposit supply mitigates dampening effect

Model Setup: Households

Utility: CES bundle of consumption C_t , deposits D_t

$$\left(C_t^{1-\frac{1}{\eta}}+\omega(D_t/P_t)^{1-\frac{1}{\eta}}\right)^{\frac{1-\frac{2}{\eta}}{1-\frac{1}{\eta}}}$$

Convenience Yield: Deposit spread $(i_t^S - i_t^D)$

$$\frac{i_t^S - i_t^D}{1 + i_t^S} = \omega \left(\frac{P_t C_t}{D_t}\right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \equiv \omega v_t^{\frac{1}{\eta}}$$

Log-Linearized Euler Equation

$$\hat{c}_{t} = E_{t}\hat{c}_{t+1} - \sigma(i_{t}^{D} - E_{t}\pi_{t+1} - r^{D}) + \sigma BE_{t}\Delta\hat{v}_{t+1} - \underbrace{\frac{\sigma(r^{S} - r^{D})}{\eta}\hat{v}_{t}}_{\text{conv. yield}}$$

CBDC Model - Deposit Supplier: CB

- CB controls deposit rate i_t^D via the Taylor rule ...
- ... and supplies deposits \hat{d}_t directly to households.

 $\hat{d}_t = \alpha \hat{d}_{t-1} - \alpha \pi_t$

- α commands nominal rigidity in deposit supply
- Convenience yield on policy rate ...

$$\hat{i}_t^s - \hat{i}_t^D = \frac{r^S - r^D}{\eta} \hat{v}_t$$

- ... dampens power of rate policy ...
- As deposit convenience moves procyclically, it dampens substitution effect on consumption
- ... and weakens conditions for local determinacy
- Mitigates self-fulfilling recessions/booms by stabilising total return of deposits

Bank Model - Deposit Supplier: Banks

Regime 1: Abundant Reserves

- CB controls reserve rate *i*^{*M*}_{*t*} via Taylor rule...
- ... and supplies reserves \hat{m}_t to banks.

$$\hat{m}_t = \alpha \hat{m}_{t-1} - \alpha \pi_t$$

 Banks issue deposits using reserves and assets â_t s.t. collateral constraint:

$$\hat{d}_t = \alpha_m \hat{m}_t + (1 - \alpha_m) \hat{a}_t$$

- Reserves abundant: no additional liquidity benefit
- Formally, model system very similar to CBDC model **Regime 2: Scarce Reserves**
- CB controls interbank rate i_t^F via Taylor rule...
- ... and supplies reserves elastically to banks at $i_r^M = 0$
- Banks also subject to liquidity constraint - Require liquid assets to back deposits inflows
- Use interbank market, reserves
- Reserves scarce: exhibit superior liquidity



Model Setup: Firms and Central Bank

 $\pi_t = E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa \hat{c}_t + B \lambda \hat{v}_t$

- Higher velocity \rightarrow higher deposit spread \rightarrow less desire to consume as C_t , D_t complements \rightarrow labour supply falls

Central Bank (CB): Controls supply of CB safe assets, and its corresponding interest rate, i_t^P , via Taylor Rule

 $i_t^P = r^P + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_c \hat{c}_t + U_t$

-10

-20

-2!

0.4

ëd 0.2

CBDC Model: Monetary Policy Shock

E -0.5

E 0.4

Dampening effect increases in:

• η^{-1} - inelasticity of deposit demand

• α - nominal rigidities of deposit supply

Firms: Phillips Curve:

from SS

-0

0.3

-0

-0.

5 D.a. .0

• $\kappa \hat{c}_t$ - standard cost channel

• $B\lambda \hat{v}_t$ - liquidity cost channel

- Abundant: retains most of CBDC dynamics
- policy strength decreases in market power
- Scarce: closer to standard New Keynesian Model
- Deposit supply becomes interest-elastic
- Intuition: $\uparrow i_t^F \rightarrow \text{cost of reserves}$, $(i_t^F i_t^M)$ rises $\rightarrow \text{cost of collateral rises} \rightarrow \hat{d}_t$ falls $\rightarrow (i_t^S i_t^D) \uparrow$
- Result: Stronger policy as convenience countercyclical