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Macroprudential Bulletin

20 June 2024
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 24
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Abstract
This article explores the benefits of a positive neutral rate for the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) and the conditions shaping the economic costs of its activation in a general equilibrium framework. The analysis shows that a gradual build-up of the buffer and favourable banking sector conditions (e.g. high profitability) limit these economic costs. Furthermore, a positive neutral CCyB rate ensures banking sector resilience in all phases of the financial cycle and improves macroprudential authorities’ ability to provide relief to the banking sector in the event of (potentially large) shocks, including those unrelated to the materialisation of domestic credit imbalances.
JEL Code
C68 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computable General Equilibrium Models
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
6 December 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 23
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Abstract
This box aims at contributing to the discussion on creating more macroprudential space via a higher amount of releasable capital buffers by proposing a simple and broad quantitative indicator to measure effective macroprudential space which takes into account that releasable buffers might be constrained by overlapping parallel capital requirements. The indicator is defined as a measure of effective releasability of capital buffers, expressed as a percentage of banks’ risk weighted assets. The box further highlights both conceptual and practical implication of considering capital overlaps when assessing macroprudential space for macroprudential authorities.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
6 December 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 23
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This box reviews the objectives and design of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) in the Basel Framework. It explains why liquidity regulation was introduced and how it is calibrated to enable banks to withstand a predefined hypothetical stress scenario combining both market-wide and idiosyncratic stress elements. The box also highlights the fact that the LCR is not designed to cover all tail events involving liquidity risk. Based on data for significant euro area (EA) institutions, the box finds that around 92% of all observed net outflow rates for retail deposits were lower than the outflow rates assumed in the LCR between 2016 and 2023. It also shows that ample liquidity buffers helped significant banks in the euro area to withstand the banking stress seen in March 2023 in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, further analysis, including on the driving factors for some of the outliers observed during stress episodes, could facilitate a better understanding of whether the LCR calibration is working as intended. To anticipate and address extreme tail events (as well as risks) not covered by the LCR, liquidity regulation needs to be complemented by frequent and granular reporting as well as rigorous supervision.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
6 December 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 23
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This box reviews the final 2017 Basel III reforms, explaining the main elements and their objectives. It provides updates on how the reforms will be transferred into EU legislation via amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRR3/CRD6), as well as on the state of play of the implementation of the 2017 Basel III reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom. It also serves as a reminder that the reforms will make banks more resilient and will lead to higher GDP in the long run.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
K20 : Law and Economics→Regulation and Business Law→General
6 December 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 23
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This article analyses the European crisis management framework for banks. It concludes that key areas for improvement are the crisis management options for small and medium-sized banks as well as preparedness for systemic crises. The European Commission’s reform proposal represents an opportunity to implement the lessons learned over the last decade.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
6 December 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 23
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This article summarises the existing evidence of window dressing and seasonality of data at year-end reporting time for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Window dressing and seasonality of data distort the outcome of a point-in-time reporting framework, resulting in misleading bank disclosures, mismeasurement of bank risk, inappropriate capital requirements and misallocation of capital. Reduced activity at certain points in time can also be detrimental to market functioning and has the potential to amplify shocks that coincide with period-ends. These negative consequences are amplified by the global nature of the activities and the systemic risk of the banks concerned. Possible policy options for addressing this phenomenon include different reporting requirements, such as averaging over higher frequency data, to ensure that the measurement of a bank’s contribution to systemic risk and capital allocation is commensurate with its actual risk to the financial system and the real economy throughout the year.
JEL Code
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
3 July 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 22
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This article discusses the role of macroprudential policy in the current environment. Although the euro area financial cycle is turning, banks remain profitable, vulnerabilities are still elevated, and financial stability risks have not yet materialised. Against this backdrop, macroprudential policy should not be loosened but should instead focus on preserving the resilience of banks and borrowers.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
3 July 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 22
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Long-term trends in loan-to-value (LTV), debt-to-income (DTI) and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratios started to reverse in 2022. Higher interest rates in combination with elevated house prices are pushing up servicing costs for mortgages, resulting in higher shares of new loans with DSTIs over 30%. In countries with regulatory caps on monthly mortgage repayment ratios, an increasing share of new loans have DSTIs close to the limits. However, banks are not making full use of the flexibility allowed to them to lend above the DSTI limits, suggesting the measures in place are not excessively constraining lending.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G51 : Financial Economics
R30 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→General
3 July 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 22
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Macroprudential policy should remain focused on maintaining capital buffers in the absence of widespread materialisation of financial stability risks. Given that the financial cycle continues to turn, this box provides a general overview of the factors that could inform potential buffer releases in the future and examines indicators and conditions under which buffer releases might be considered.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
26 April 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 21
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This article discusses the possible implementation of a positive neutral rate for the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) as a means of increasing macroprudential policy space in the European banking union. Drawing on experience from the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, it explains why a positive neutral rate is needed to enhance the effectiveness of the current macroprudential framework. It also describes recent progress on the application of this tool around the globe and concludes with some remarks on the calibration and potential future application of the tool in the banking union.
3 April 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 20
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This article analyses the financial stability risks of investment funds active in euro area commercial real estate (CRE) markets. It finds that real estate investment funds (REIFs) have grown significantly in the past decade, and have a large market footprint in several euro area countries where the outlook for CRE markets has deteriorated sharply. In addition, REIFs are exposed to liquidity risk when they offer frequent redemptions, which could affect the stability of CRE markets. REIFs should therefore be subject to a common and comprehensive policy framework to reduce the liquidity mismatch and risks to financial stability.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
R33 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→Nonagricultural and Nonresidential Real Estate Markets
10 October 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 19
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During the Covid-19 pandemic banks appear to have avoided lending to firms reliant on real estate as collateral. When banks applied downward revaluations to existing real estate collateral they were also less likely to extend loans, particularly to highly leveraged borrowers.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
10 October 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 19
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In recent years different macroprudential sectoral risk weight policies have been used in EU countries to address systemic risk in residential real estate markets. This focus shows that the impact of sectoral risk weight floors, add-ons and multipliers is similar to the impact of different sectoral capital and leverage ratio requirement policies.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
R38 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→Government Policy
10 October 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 19
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This focus shows that the interest rate sensitivity of the loan-service-to-income (LSTI) ratio depends on the initial loan-to-income (LTI) ratio, the loan maturity, the interest rate fixation period and the initial interest rate. Based on loan-level simulations for securitised mortgages we find that LSTI increases in response to higher interest rates would be manageable for most loans but pockets of vulnerabilities exist.
JEL Code
G51 : Financial Economics
E27 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
10 October 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 19
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This focus proposes a novel framework, a combined price quantity model, which features demand and supply long-run relationships in the housing market, to assess the status of house prices and housing investment relative to equilibrium levels. It shows that in the first quarter of 2022 euro area house prices are estimated to be more than 10% above their equilibrium level, while housing investment is close to its equilibrium.
JEL Code
E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
R30 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→General
10 October 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 19
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For a comprehensive RRE risk assessment and to set macroprudential measures targeting RRE, it is important to understand the main drivers of RRE developments and the implications of the various scenarios for the RRE market outlook. In this focus, we propose a model framework based on Bayesian vector autoregressions to shed more light on these issues.
JEL Code
C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
R30 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→General
10 October 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 19
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This article examines links between Commercial Real Estate (CRE) markets and financial stability. The global financial crisis demonstrated the implications of CRE boom-bust cycles for the stability of many countries’ financial systems. However, CRE risk assessment and macroprudential policy frameworks remain in their infancy due to both the markets’ complexity and the persistence of data gaps. This article takes steps towards closing a number of data gaps by using euro area credit register data to examine the size and nature of links between euro area (EA) banks and CRE markets. Moreover, given that this dataset covers the COVID-19 pandemic crisis period, the operation of these transmission channels can be seen in action, providing insight into how economic theory plays out in practice.
JEL Code
G00 : Financial Economics→General→General
C55 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Modeling with Large Data Sets?
R30 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→General
10 October 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 19
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Macroprudential measures can effectively support the resilience of households and banks and help tame the build-up of residential real estate (RRE) vulnerabilities. By capping the riskiness of new loans, borrower-based measures contribute to moderating RRE vulnerabilities in the short-term and to increasing the resilience of households over the medium term. By inducing banks to use more equity financing, capital-based measures increase bank resilience in the short and medium term but are unlikely to have a significant dampening effect on RRE vulnerabilities during the upswing phase of a financial cycle. The two categories of measures are mainly complementary and many European countries have therefore implemented them in combination in recent years.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
R38 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→Government Policy
10 October 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 19
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Understanding the drivers for residential real estate (RRE) price developments, measuring house price overvaluation, monitoring trends in bank lending and borrowers’ creditworthiness is important for assessing RRE risks and informing policy responses. The ECB uses a comprehensive monitoring framework for regularly assessing RRE vulnerabilities comprising a series of core risk indicators complemented by a broad set of analytical tools. This article describes some of these tools to explain how they are employed in risk analysis.
JEL Code
R31 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→Housing Supply and Markets
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G51 : Financial Economics
10 October 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 19
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Abstract
Credit-fuelled real estate booms can pose financial stability risks due to the important direct and indirect links between real estate markets, the economy and the financial system. Different types of macroprudential policy tools can be used to increase resilience to financial stability risks from residential real estate (RRE) markets. Borrower-based tools put a cap on the risk characteristics of new loans, while capital-based tools increase the loss absorption capacity of banks. The ECB, together with the national authorities, has an important role to play in shaping the macroprudential policy response to RRE risks in the euro area.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
G51 : Financial Economics
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
R38 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→Government Policy
11 July 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 18
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This article describes the main features and risks of decentralised finance (DeFi), focusing in particular on similarities and differences between DeFi and traditional finance. While the financial services provided through DeFi mainly replicate those of traditional financial services but within the crypto-asset ecosystem, they are provided in a novel way that relies on automated protocols and cuts out centralised intermediaries. The article explains how this novel method of service provision entails specific financial stability risks and regulatory challenges.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
11 July 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 18
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Some crypto-assets have a significant carbon footprint and are estimated to consume a similar amount of energy each year to individual countries like Spain, the Netherlands or Austria. As the mining and expansion of these crypto-assets are fully dependent on energy supply, their valuation is particularly vulnerable to jurisdictions’ climate policies. Increasing financial exposures to such crypto-assets are therefore likely to contribute to increased transition risk for the financial system. This article provides an overview of the estimated carbon footprint of certain crypto-assets such as bitcoin and its causes. It also discusses the primary policy role of public authorities, which need to evaluate whether the outsized carbon footprint of certain crypto-assets undermines their green transition commitments. Finally, it analyses policy options for prudential standard-setters and the need for climate-related considerations in crypto-investors’ practices.
JEL Code
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
11 July 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 18
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Stablecoins are in the spotlight due to their rapid growth, increasing global use cases and potential financial risk contagion channels. This article analyses the role played by stablecoins within the wider crypto-asset ecosystem and finds that some existing stablecoins are already critical to liquidity in crypto-asset markets. This could have wide-ranging implications for crypto-asset markets if a large stablecoin were to fail and could also have contagion effects if crypto-assets’ interlinkages with the traditional financial system continue rising. To date, the speed and cost of stablecoin transactions, as well as their redemption terms and conditions, have fallen short of what is required of practical means of payment in the real economy. Their growth, innovation and increasing use cases, coupled with their potential contagion channels to the financial sector, call for the urgent implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and oversight frameworks before significant further interconnectedness with the traditional financial system occurs.
JEL Code
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
G13 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Contingent Pricing, Futures Pricing
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
11 July 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 18
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Financial stability risks stemming from crypto-assets are rising, and the crypto-asset ecosystem has become more complex and interconnected. This issue of the Macroprudential Bulletin takes a deep dive into the risks and policy implications of several segments of the crypto-asset market. One central element is stablecoins, whose growth, innovation and increasing global use cases call for the urgent implementation of appropriate regulatory, supervisory and oversight frameworks before significant further interconnectedness with the traditional financial system occurs. Another fast-growing segment within the crypto ecosystem is decentralised finance (DeFi), whose novel way of providing financial services without relying on centralised intermediaries entails specific financial stability risks and regulatory challenges. Lastly, this issue highlights the climate transition risk for the financial sector stemming from the significant carbon footprint of certain crypto-assets like bitcoin and proposes potential measures that can be taken by authorities..
JEL Code
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
13 June 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 17
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This special focus discusses how different segments of the financial sector, i.e. banks, insurers, pension funds, investment funds and hedge funds, react to stress scenarios similar to some of those observed at the onset of the pandemic. In our framework, different financial intermediaries interact in asset, funding and derivatives markets, and face solvency and liquidity constraints. The model is calibrated to the euro area and simulates two shocks, namely a deterioration in the corporate outlook and a large-scale rating downgrade of corporate bonds. It estimates balance-sheet losses for the main euro area financial sectors and the change in prices of marketable financial assets.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G288 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
13 June 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 17
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Regulatory stress tests have outgrown their initial role of assessing the robustness of individual financial institutions. Today, they are used to test the resilience of financial systems, set prudential policies, and communicate with the industry and markets.
JEL Code
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
13 June 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 17
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The publication of stress test results improves transparency and market discipline. It promotes financial stability by generating new information, thus improving the ability of markets to discriminate between banks. The results of this analysis confirm the certification role of stress tests.
JEL Code
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
13 June 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 17
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Macroprudential stress testing has provided timely policy assessment to tackle high levels of uncertainty about future developments during the COVID-19 pandemic and to back communications promoting the use of macroprudential capital buffers by banks. The lessons learned from the crisis can inform the setting of buffers along the path to policy normalisation.
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
13 June 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 17
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A system-wide stress testing framework allows for a comprehensive assessment of the financial impact of severe climate risk scenarios. The combined reactions of banks, investment funds and insurers to climate stress amplify losses in the financial system.
JEL Code
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
L14 : Industrial Organization→Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance→Transactional Relationships, Contracts and Reputation, Networks
21 January 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 16
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This impact assessment shows that a mandatory public debt holding would reduce the liquidity risk of private debt money market funds by increasing their shock absorption capacity and diversifying their asset liquidity profile. This would enable these funds to better mitigate the externalities associated with large-scale redemptions. The analysis also considers possible costs related to the funding of non-financial corporations and the attractiveness of MMFs as well as possible feasibility issues in terms of the supply of public debt.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
21 January 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 16
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This article assesses proposed reforms to the European Money Market Funds (MMF) Regulation to enhance the resilience of the sector. Specifically, the article provides a rationale for requiring private debt MMFs to hold higher levels of liquid assets, of which a part should be public debt, and considers the design and calibration of such a requirement. The article also proposes that the impediments to the use of liquidity buffers should be removed and authorities should have a role in releasing these buffers. Finally, while the removal of a stable net asset value for low-volatility MMFs would reduce cliff effects, we argue that this might not be necessary if liquidity requirements for these private debt MMFs are sufficiently strengthened.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
19 October 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 15
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Abstract
Green capital markets are growing rapidly while being more resilient and integrated than traditional markets. Enhancing market structures and standards will help decrease greenwashing risk and foster further growth in green finance and the transition towards carbon neutrality.
JEL Code
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
Q56 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Environment and Development, Environment and Trade, Sustainability, Environmental Accounts and Accounting, Environmental Equity, Population Growth
19 October 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 15
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By means of a theoretical model, this analysis finds that without policy intervention, transition risk generates excessive risk-taking by banks. This finding provides a theoretical justification for the introduction of climate prudential policies to address transition risks.
JEL Code
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
19 October 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 15
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The publication introduces a stress test approach which recognises that banks adjust to scenario adversity and that climate-related risks ingrained in long-term climate-related scenarios add to other deep-seated cyclical and structural risks in economic systems. This macroprudential approach quantifies the impact of climate-oriented scenarios on the banking system by looking at both the expected long-term growth trajectories and the cumulation of risks in lower tails of growth distribution.
JEL Code
E17 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General Aggregative Models→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
19 October 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 15
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This article estimates the “greenness” of euro area investors and the impact that the EU taxonomy could have on the markets by redirecting financial resources towards sustainable economic activities and by contributing to fill the investment gap in the relevant sectors.
JEL Code
G2 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services
G3 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
19 October 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 15
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Abstract
This article analysis the challenges of incorporating climate risks and their unique features in the existing prudential framework and explores potential avenues for addressing gaps identified in the banking framework.
JEL Code
Q54 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Climate, Natural Disasters, Global Warming
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
26 July 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 14
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Abstract
This article assesses the economic costs and benefits of the Basel III finalisation package for the euro area and shows that the transitory costs of the reform are outweighed by its permanent long-term benefits. Implementing EU-specific modifications to the Basel III reform, such as the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) supporting factor, credit valuation adjustment (CVA) exemptions and discretion with regard to the operational risk capital charge, reduce the already moderate transitory costs of the reform, although they also reduce its long-run benefits. Approaches that, in addition, modify the implementation of the output floor fail to further reduce the short-term economic costs of the reform while again decreasing its long-term benefits.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
28 June 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 13
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Abstract
This contribution reviews historical drivers of bank dividend payouts in the euro area. Economic literature presents three main reasons for adjustments to dividend payouts: asymmetric information between shareholders and management, the presence of agency costs, and regulatory constraints. Using a panel data approach, the article finds evidence supporting all three hypotheses. Banks lower dividends after facing a decline in profits and capital, but counterfactual simulations show that this adjustment could be small. Regulatory restrictions may therefore be warranted in the event of large expected losses or heavy uncertainty.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G35 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Payout Policy
28 June 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 13
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Abstract
This article evaluates the impact on euro area bank valuations of the March 2020 European Central Bank (ECB) recommendation not to pay dividends or buy back shares. The analysis provides evidence of a negative impact on bank valuations in the order of magnitude of 7%. That impact is not, however, homogenous across banks: institutions that pay out dividends but fail to generate returns commensurate with investor requirements are found to be more strongly affected than those generating shareholder value or banks that are too weak to pay out dividends even in the absence of dividend restrictions. Further, the analysis suggests that uncertainty over future distributions arising from the SSM recommendation, rather than the suspension of dividends per se, explains most of the negative impact on bank valuations. By construction, this analysis captures the side effects of the measure, notwithstanding its overall merit in preserving bank capital and sustaining bank intermediation capacity during the COVID-19 period.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
C31 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Cross-Sectional Models, Spatial Models, Treatment Effect Models, Quantile Regressions, Social Interaction Models
28 June 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 13
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Abstract
This article studies the impact of the ECB’s dividend recommendations on banks’ lending and loss-absorption capacity during the COVID-19 crisis. It finds that the policy has been effective in mitigating the potential procyclical adjustment of banks. Banks that did not distribute previously planned dividends increased their lending by around 2.4% and their provisions by approximately 5.5%, thus strengthening their capacity to absorb losses. Notably, the recommendations appear to have mitigated the procyclical behaviour of banks closer to the threshold for automatic restrictions on distributions. Overall, the recommendations were successful in conserving capital and helping the banking system support the real economy and facilitate the recognition of future losses.
JEL Code
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G35 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Payout Policy
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
28 June 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 13
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Abstract
This article provides an overview of the actions aimed at reducing or suspending banks’ distributions on a system-wide basis. It finds that such measures imply a number of pros and cons which deserve further analysis. On the one hand, system-wide restrictions on distributions complement and enhance the effectiveness of other public support measures, including prudential relief measures, by ensuring that the “freed-up” capital is used for the purposes of supporting the real economy and absorbing losses. Furthermore, system-wide measures simultaneously address adverse incentives to deleverage by removing the stigma effects associated with institution-specific restrictions. On the other hand, the implementation of system-wide restrictions on distributions presents several concomitant drawbacks and challenges. In particular, investors may be reluctant to invest in banks which are subject to restrictions, which may hamper banks ’ability to raise capital in the longer term. Other challenges include interference with the smooth functioning of the internal market and the possibility of the measures becoming less effective over time when introduced via soft-law instruments.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G35 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Payout Policy
12 April 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 12
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Abstract
Large differences between the liquidity of investment funds’ assets and liabilities (i.e. liquidity mismatches) can create vulnerabilities in the financial system and expose funds to a risk of large outflows and sudden drops in market liquidity. From a macroprudential perspective, the current regulatory framework may not sufficiently address the risks stemming from liquidity mismatches in investment funds. By modelling the liquidity management of an open-ended fund, this article provides theoretical justification for pre-emptive policy measures such as cash buffers that enhance financial stability by helping to increase the resilience of investment funds.
JEL Code
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
12 April 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 12
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Abstract
Following the onset of the coronavirus (COVID‑19) crisis, a significant number of European investment funds suspended redemptions. We find that many of those funds had invested in illiquid assets, were leveraged or had lower cash holdings than funds that were not suspended. Furthermore, suspensions were more likely to be seen in jurisdictions where pre-emptive liquidity measures were not available. Our findings also suggest that suspensions have spillover effects on other funds and sectors, highlighting the importance of pre-emptive liquidity management measures.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
12 April 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 12
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Abstract
The turmoil seen in March 2020 highlighted key vulnerabilities in the money market fund (MMF) sector. This article assesses the effectiveness of the EU’s regulatory framework from a financial stability perspective and identifies three important lessons. First, investment in non-public debt assets exposes MMFs to liquidity risk, highlighting the need to limit investment in illiquid assets. Second, low-volatility net asset value (LVNAV) funds are particularly vulnerable to liquidity shocks, given that they invest in non-public debt assets while offering a stable net asset value (NAV). Enhanced portfolio requirements could strengthen their liquidity profile. And third, MMFs seem reluctant to draw down on their liquidity buffers during periods of stress, suggesting a need to make buffers more usable.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
12 April 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 12
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Abstract
During the market turmoil of March 2020, many money market funds (MMFs) and other investment funds which were exposed to liquidity risk through a liquidity mismatch between their assets and liabilities experienced significant outflows. Those funds reacted in a procyclical manner by either selling assets in already stressed markets or curtailing investors’ access. That behaviour resulted in knock-on effects on other sectors of the economy and amplified the stress within the financial system. This overview article discusses financial stability risks arising from liquidity transformation by MMFs and other investment funds, a subject which is then explored in greater depth in the three other articles in this issue of the Macroprudential Bulletin. While the liquidity transformation carried out by investment funds serves an important economic function, by intermediating savings and real economy financing, it can also generate risks to financial stability. With this in mind, this article argues for a macroprudential approach to the regulation of investment funds to enhance their resilience and facilitate a stable provision of funding to the wider economy in both normal market conditions and periods of market stress.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
19 October 2020
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ANNEX - No. 11
19 October 2020
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 11
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Abstract
Had authorities built up larger countercyclical buffers before the pandemic, it would have been easier to release capital in response to the crisis. The “lower for longer” interest rate environment reinforces the case for building up releasable buffers in good times. The article shows that enhancing countercyclical capacity can improve the policy mix available to achieve macro-financial stabilisation.
JEL Code
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
19 October 2020
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 11
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Abstract
This article discusses how market pressure can impede the usability of regulatory buffers. The capital relief measures in the euro area since the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis had so far mixed effects on banks’ target CET1 ratio, suggesting an impeded pass-through. Market pressure can be a key explanatory factor, with pressure from credit and, critically, equity investors.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics
19 October 2020
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 11
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Abstract
This article analyses the role of capital buffers in containing the reduction of lending to the real economy during the COVID-19 crisis. Our results show that banks’ use of capital buffers leads to better economic outcomes, without a negative impact on their resilience. Banks’ willingness to use capital buffers is reflected in higher lending, with positive effects on GDP and lower credit losses, while the resilience of the banking system is not compromised.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation
C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
C54 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Quantitative Policy Modeling
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
19 October 2020
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 11
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Abstract
This article discusses capital buffer usability in the Basel III framework. Although buffers are intended to be used in a crisis, a number of factors can prevent banks from drawing them down in case of need, with potentially adverse effects for the economy. The article reviews the functioning of the framework in the COVID-19 crisis and outlines possible implications for future policy design.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
5 May 2020
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 10
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Abstract
Stablecoins provide an alternative to volatile crypto-assets. Depending on their asset management function, they may fall under different regulatory regimes or – with certain design features – under none at all. Given their potential size, global stablecoins could pose risks to financial stability. Such arrangements need a robust regulatory framework.
JEL Code
E42 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Monetary Systems, Standards, Regimes, Government and the Monetary System, Payment Systems
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
29 October 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 9
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Abstract
The post-crisis regulatory framework introduced multiple requirements on banks’ capital and liquidity positions, sparking a discussion among policymakers and academics on how the various requirements interact with one another. This article contributes to the discussion on the interaction of different regulatory metrics by empirically examining the interaction between the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) for banks in the euro area. The findings suggest that the two liquidity requirements are complementary and constrain different types of banks in different ways, similarly to the risk-based and leverage ratio requirements in the capital framework. This dispels claims that the LCR and the NSFR are redundant and underlines the need for a faithful and consistent implementation of both measures (and the entire Basel III package more broadly) across all major jurisdictions, to maintain a level playing field at the global level and to ensure that the post-crisis regulatory framework delivers on its objectives.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
29 October 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ANNEX - No. 9
29 October 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 9
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Abstract
Initial margin (IM) reduces counterparty credit risk in derivative markets. Notwithstanding efforts to limit potential procyclical effects of IM-setting practices, there is an ongoing debate about whether the current framework sufficiently addresses this concern, in particular when Value-at-Risk (VaR) models are used for setting IM. This article provides further insights into this issue. First, using EMIR data, we provide an overview of outstanding IM in the euro area derivative market and identify the most relevant sectors for the exchange of IM. Second, using a VaR IM model in line with industry practice, we show that aggregate IM can potentially vary substantially over a long-term horizon. Finally, we show that an IM floor based on a standardised IM model could be an effective tool for reducing IM procyclicality.
JEL Code
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
29 October 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 9
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Abstract
A recent ECB study shows that leverage is an important driver in investors’ redemption decisions. Regulatory changes to the UCITS framework facilitated the use of derivatives, increasing leverage for some European mutual funds which amplified investors' responsiveness to negative returns in a procyclical manner.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
29 October 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 9
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Abstract
This article aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the long-term strategy for stress testing in the euro area. In particular, it highlights some of the strengths and weaknesses of the constrained bottom-up approach, which is currently used in the EU‑wide stress-testing exercise. Under this approach, banks use their own models to generate stress test projections on the basis of a common macroeconomic scenario and under the constraints imposed by the European Banking Authority methodology. This set-up provides banks with some scope to underestimate their vulnerabilities in order to appear more resilient than their peers. This article confirms previous empirical evidence showing that such behaviour may indeed be practised by banks. This, in turn, requires a robust quality assurance of banks’ stress test projections by the competent authorities (including the European Central Bank), to enforce more realistic results. Against this background, the article presents a novel empirical analysis providing indicative evidence that the “supervisory scrutiny” relating to the quality assurance may be having a disciplining effect on banks’ risk-taking.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
29 October 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 9
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Abstract
Cyclical systemic risk tends to build up well ahead of financial crises and is measured best by credit and asset price dynamics. This article shows that high levels of cyclical systemic risk lead to large downside risks to the bank-level return on assets three to five years ahead. Hence, exuberant credit and asset price dynamics tend to increase considerably the likelihood of large future bank losses. Given the tight link between bank losses and reductions in bank capital, the results presented in this article can be used to quantify the level of “Bank capital-at-risk” (BCaR) for a banking system. BCaR is a useful tool for macroprudential policy makers as it helps to quantify how much additional bank resilience could be needed if imbalances unwind and systemic risk materialises.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation
C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
C54 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Quantitative Policy Modeling
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
29 October 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOREWORD - No. 9
16 September 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOREWORD - No. 8
16 September 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 8
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Abstract
How do changes in bank capital requirements affect bank lending, lending spreads and the broader macroeconomy? The answer to this question is important for calibrating and assessing macroprudential policies. There is, however, relatively little empirical evidence to answer this question in the case of the euro area countries. This article contributes to filling this gap by studying the effects of changes in economic bank capital buffers in the four largest euro area countries. We use bank-level data and macroeconomic information to estimate a bank-internal, target level of economic capital ratio, i.e. the capital ratio that a bank would like to hold considering its own characteristics (size, profitability, risk aversion of its creditors, risk exposure, etc.) and macroeconomic conditions (expected GDP growth, etc.). Economic bank capital buffers are then computed as the difference between the current and the target economic capital ratio. However, due to adjustment costs, banks cannot adjust the actual capital ratio to the target level instantaneously. As a result, a change in the target capital ratio will result in an instantaneous change in the economic capital buffer. These buffers are aggregated at the country level and included in a panel Bayesian vector auto regressive (VAR) model. With the VAR, it is then possible to compute the response of macroeconomic and banking variables to a change in the buffer. The idea is that changes in economic capital buffers mimic the effects a change in regulatory capital requirements would have on the economy. We find that a negative economic capital buffer shock, i.e. a decline in actual capital ratios below the target level, leads to a modest decline in output and prices and to a larger decline in bank lending growth. By affecting the difference between actual and target economic capital ratios, these findings suggest that countercyclical capital-based macroprudential policy measures can be useful to dampen the financial cycle.
JEL Code
C11 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→Bayesian Analysis: General
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
16 September 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 8
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Abstract
The expansion of the EU macroprudential toolkit to also include capital buffers applied at sectoral level may require the cross-border recognition of these instruments. This article explores the relevance of sectoral cross-border credit provided via foreign branches or direct cross-border lending in the SSM area and analyses the effects of the implementation of mandatory reciprocity arrangements. Our findings provide some evidence supporting the introduction of mandatory reciprocity arrangements for sectoral capital buffers where exposures are material in order to ensure a level playing field and pre-empt future leakages. This is important to foster the effectiveness of macroprudential policies because financial services provided via foreign branches or direct cross-border exposures would otherwise not be subject to a macroprudential measure taken in a host Member State.
JEL Code
C68 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computable General Equilibrium Models
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
16 September 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 8
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Abstract
As discussions progress on the potential design of sectoral capital buffers both at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and European levels, this article discusses the advantages and shortcomings of the sectoral application of the countercyclical capital buffer for addressing sectoral systemic risks. A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DGSE) model is used to explore and compare the transmission channels of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) and the sectoral countercyclical capital buffer (SCCyB), as well as their role in enhancing the resilience of banks and taming the procyclicality of credit. The model-based policy exercise indicates that, if risks are confined to one particular credit sector, a SCCyB could prove more effective than the CCyB in strengthening bank resilience to the target sector and in mitigating sectoral credit imbalances.
JEL Code
C68 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computable General Equilibrium Models
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
27 March 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOREWORD - No. 7
27 March 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 7
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Abstract
This study analyses whether the ability of the euro area banking system to withstand potential shocks while minimising taxpayers’ costs has changed in the ten years since the financial crisis as a consequence of the impact of post-crisis reforms on bank capital and loss-absorbing capacity. The results show that the average probability of default of banks decreased from 3.5% in 2007 to 1.1% in 2017, less than a third of its pre-crisis value. In addition, under conservative assumptions on the scope of liabilities affected by the bail-in tool, banks’ loss-absorbing capacity has increased from 7.2% to 12.0% of total assets owing to the introduction of larger capital buffers and the new resolution framework, which enhances banks’ loss-absorbing capacity via the bail-in tool. Finally, the potential intervention of the Single Resolution Fund has further increased the loss-absorbing capacity of the system to 16.9% of total assets. Considering all these three factors, the ability of the banking system to absorb losses while minimising costs to taxpayers has increased more than 3-fold over the last ten years. When considering a broader scope for the bail-in tool, the system’s loss-absorbing capacity has increased to 55.5% of total assets, which corresponds to an overall 12-fold increase in its ability to absorb losses while minimising taxpayers’ costs.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
27 March 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 7
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Abstract
The macroprudential stress test of the euro area banking system examines the effects of the baseline and adverse scenarios on the 91 largest euro area credit institutions across 19 countries. The analysis looks at the financial system as a whole and acknowledges the interdependencies between banks and the real economy. In particular, it takes into account banks’ reaction to changing economic conditions and to deterioration in their balance sheets. The results indicate substantial resilience of the euro area banking system at the current juncture. The macroprudential stress test predicts a lower negative impact on capital ratios, though higher capital depletion, in billions of euro, than a static balance-sheet stress test. It also shows that banks’ deleveraging tied to deteriorating capitalisation and asset quality leads to further deterioration in economic conditions in an adverse scenario.
JEL Code
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
27 March 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 7
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Abstract
This article presents the ECB framework for assessing financial stability risks stemming from residential real estate markets and for designing macroprudential policy responses. It reviews recent developments in residential real estate markets and policy initiatives to address risks.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
R30 : Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics→Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location→General
27 March 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 7
Details
Abstract
When living by the ocean, instead of trying to calm the waves and tides, building a levee or a breakwater is the safest option. This article reviews the country-specific strategic choices and decisions regarding timing and calibration of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) in countries participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). It identifies commonalities across countries and country specificities that influence decisions by national designated authorities. In so doing, it summarises the limitations encountered with the credit-to-GDP gap and the role of other indicators and factors in calibrating the appropriate CCyB rate on the basis of “guided discretion”. Ultimately, assessing risks across euro area countries consistently, while taking into account country-specific factors, supports the effective use of the CCyB as a macroprudential instrument and ensures that similar risk exposures are subject to the same set of macroprudential requirements.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission
27 March 2019
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ANNEX - No. 7
2 October 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOREWORD - No. 6
2 October 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 6
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Abstract
This article summarises the key findings from a counterfactual exercise where the effect of removing repo assets from the leverage ratio on banks’ default probabilities is considered. The findings suggest that granting such an exemption may have adverse effects on the stability of the financial system, even when measures are introduced to compensate for the decline in capital required by the leverage ratio framework. Increases in probabilities of default are mainly seen for larger banks which are more active in the repo market. Moreover, it is observed that the predictive power of the model improves when repo assets are included. Overall, the analysis in this article does not support a more lenient treatment of repo assets in the leverage ratio framework, e.g. by exempting them or allowing for more netting with repo liabilities or against high-quality government bonds.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
2 October 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 6
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Abstract
This article evaluates whether the global systemically important bank (G-SIB) framework has incentivised banks to adopt window-dressing behaviour, and whether their engagement in capital market activities has facilitated it. Window-dressing behaviour could have detrimental effects on financial stability, for at least two reasons: first, it may imply an underestimation of banks’ overall systemic importance and a distortion of the relative ranking in favour of banks that engage in more window-dressing behaviour; second, overall market functioning may be adversely affected if banks reduce the provision of certain services towards the end of the year. The evidence presented in this article suggests that both G-SIBs and banks with reporting obligations have reduced their overall risk score and some of their individual risk indicators at the end of a calendar year, both in absolute terms and relative to the other banks in the sample. The results also indicate that year-end reductions in capital market activities are a main driver of the observed window-dressing behaviour.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G38 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Government Policy and Regulation
2 October 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 6
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Abstract
This article aims to facilitate discussion on potential macroprudential tools for investment funds. To this end, the article puts forward an initial assessment based on the application of a conceptual framework and aims to inform the debate on the potential design aspects of macroprudential liquidity tools. In line with the ESRB’s approach to developing macroprudential instruments, the effectiveness and efficiency of various macroprudential liquidity tools for investment funds are thoroughly assessed. The article provides an overview of the various liquidity tools and assesses the suitability of these tools for containing the materialisation of systemic risks through various channels.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
2 October 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ANNEX - No. 6
30 April 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOREWORD - No. 5
30 April 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 5
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Abstract
This article presents stylised facts from the euro area network of large exposures and derives model-based interconnectedness measures of SSM significant institutions. The article has three main findings. First, the interbank network is relatively sparse and suggests a core-periphery network structure. Second, the more complex network measures on average correlate highly with the more simple size-based interconnectedness indicators, constructed following the EBA guidelines on the calibration of O-SII buffers. Third, there is nevertheless value for policymakers to take into account network-based measures in addition to the size-based interconnectedness indicators, as for some individual banks those measures can deviate considerably.
JEL Code
C63 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→Computational Techniques, Simulation Modeling
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
30 April 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 5
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Abstract
The rapid growth of the asset management sector over recent years has raised questions about the interaction between traditional banks and investment funds, as well as the drivers behind this trend. Our analysis contributes to this debate by shedding light on the implications of increased competition between the two sectors. We first examine how competition between banks and investment funds drives the risk profiles and market shares of these two sectors. In a second step, we assess whether and how capital requirements for banks influence the relative market shares of the two sectors, contributing to both the analysis of the drivers behind the structural developments in the euro area financial sector and the work on the evaluation of the impact of post-crisis reforms.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
30 April 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 5
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Abstract
The European Commission’s proposals for the reform of EU banking rules aim to complete the post-crisis reform agenda and to address shortcomings in the current regulatory framework, notably in the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV). Once implemented, the changes will strengthen the regulatory architecture in the European Union, thereby contributing to the reduction of risks in the banking sector and paving the way for commensurate progress in completing the banking union. This article outlines and explains the ECB’s key messages concerning these proposals that are of particular importance for macroprudential regulation and policy. In particular, the ECB considers that the ongoing discussions on the CRR/CRD IV package provide the opportunity to make targeted changes to the macroprudential toolkit to make it more efficient and consistent. In the medium term, a comprehensive review of the macroprudential toolkit is still necessary to streamline procedures within the framework and to complement it with tools to address risks in the real estate and non-banking sectors.
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
30 April 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ANNEX - No. 5
19 December 2017
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - No. 4
9 June 2017
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - No. 3
25 October 2016
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - No. 2
23 March 2016
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - No. 1